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In general, agricultural producers operate in a risky environment 
_which inevitably affects their expected incomes. Just (1975) 
identified three sources of risk and uncertainty that deserve 
attention in agriculture: (1) risk as.sociated with environmental and 
technological factors such as weather, diseases, pests, and improved 
crop varieties and livestock breeds; (2) risk associated with market 
factors such as price and income fluctuations, input supplies and 
competing demands for inputs, and (3) uncertainty with respect to 
pol icy changes such as government programs, level of supports and 
regulations of pesticides and waste. 
Agricultural producers in developing countries are frequently 
more exposed to risk given the poor economical, technological and 
institutional conditions which prevail. Therefore, an understanding 
of the risk factor, as it affects peasant agricultural production and 
development, is an essential ingredient of rational planning of 
individual farms and the rural sector as a whole. However, this 
important ingredient has seldom been considered in studies and plans 





Agriculture plays a major role in the economy of the Sudan. It 
contributes nearly 40 percent of the gross domestic product while 80 
percent of the population depends for its subsistence on agriculture 
and related activities. The sector produces food for local 
population, raw materials for industries and surpluses of food and 
industrial crops for exports. Indeed, agriculture is the major source 
of exportable commodities accounting for over 90 percent of the 
country's foreign exchange earnings. The economic activities in other 
sectors of the economy, especially transportation and industry are 
critically linked with those of the agricultural sector. It is 
natural, therefore, that a vigorous and prosperous agriculture is the 
cornerstone for any development planning in the Sudan (Ministry of 
Planning, 1977). 
Out of 200 million feddans (1 feddan = 1.038 acres) of productive 
land suitable for both crop and animal production, less than 10 
per cent is currently used (World Bank, 1979). The two main subsectors 
of the agricultural sector are irrigated and rainfed or dryland 
farming. Government efforts and interests have been directed 
primarily towards the irrigated subsector. Concentration of the main 
cash crops such as cotton and groundnut in irrigated areas reinforces 
this tendency. 
The cent ra 1 posit ion of agriculture in the Sudanese economy and 
the importance of studying the risk factors in irrigated agriculture 
justified the choice of an irrigation project for this study. The 
Gezira Scheme is a public sector irrigation enterprise that originated 
in 1925 when a new dam was constructed across the Blue Nile River to 
provide irrigation water for the region. The Scheme occupys an area 
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of 2.2 million feddans which account for 63.7 percent of the total 
irrigated area in the Sudan (World Bank, 1979). At present the Scheme 
provides di rec t emp 1 oymen t to about 96 ,000 tenants (producers) and 
their fami 1 i es. Tenants in the project area are al located tenancies 
described to be homogenous and of equal size. The crops grown in the 
project area are mainly cotton, groundnut, sorghum, wheat and 
vegetables. 
The government appoints a board of directors to operate and 
organize the production process in the project area following policy 
guidelines issued by the Ministry of Agriculture. The project 
management sets forth rules and guidelines for the tenant that include 
all aspects of production and marketing, from seed variety selection 
to the market price of the produce (Zaki, 1980). For the Gezira 
Scheme, the government provides irrigation water, land, administrative 
management, research and extension, institutional credit and marketing 
of cotton and wheat. The tenants, on the other hand, supply the 
necessary labor to perform crop husbandry practices and provide the 
credit and marketing for the other crops in the rotation, namely 
groundnut and sorghum. 
The agricultural production relations between the government and 
the tenant have experienced a variety of changes over time. Currently 
this relationship is specified by a predetermined land and water 
charge which the tenant is obliged to pay in return for services 
provided. The land and water rate is issued by a decree from the 
Ministry of Agriculture and revised every year based on irrigation 
cos ts, management costs and a nominal land fee. It is based on a per 
feddan basis for each crop. 
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For the Gezira Scheme the government emphasizes cotton production 
which is the single cash crop accounting for about 50 percent of total 
exports. Such heavy dependence on a single export crop is likely to 
effect on the stability of a country's foreign exchange earnings and 
· consequently the national development process. Indeed, fluctuations 
in cotton yields and prices have important impacts on both tenant and 
government income. At the international level, the Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO, 1983) argues that the competitive 
position of cotton is unlikely to improve in the short term as the 
downward pressure on prices is expected to continue and prices of 
competing man-made fibers are expected to remain low. Depressed 
output levels in the textile industry in some major cotton importing 
countries, the sharp appreciation of the U.S. dollar and high interest 
rates for maintaining stocks are among the reasons cited by FAQ that 
have led to reduced import demand, particularly in Europe. 
Problem Statement 
The six year development plan of the Sudan for the period 
1977-1983 emphasized that agriculture must continue to play a major 
role in the overall development strategy. This emphasis on 
agriculture was to reverse the recent trend of declining agricultural 
productivity and diminishing contribution of agriculture to the 
Sudan's foreign exchange earnings. According to the World Bank 
Dev e 1 o pme n t Report (1982), the percentage contribution of agriculture 
to the gross domestic product has declined from 61 percent in 1955-56 
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to 38 percent in 1980-81. Among the agricultural projects which are 
reported to have declining productivity is the Gezira Scheme. Despite 
recent efforts to increse production through increased investment 
funds to the project, productivity and net returns per feddan have 
declined considerably. 
Decisions on crop rotations in the Gezira Scheme are made by the 
government and dictated by national objectives. Government policy in 
the Gezira Scheme frequently ignores the tenant's preference including 
attitudes towards risk. Historically government interest has focused 
on cotton, which does not necessarily match tenant interest. Since 
cotton and food crops compete for land, labor, irrigated water and 
capital resources, the competitive position and risk factors of each 
activity are essential for selection of the optimum farm plan. 
Decisions on institutional credit provided to tenants is the 
responsibility of the government policymakers and the project 
management. Again, tenants have not shared in making this decision, 
even though it directly affects their productivity and reduces their 
dependence on outside moneylenders. Another problem relates to the 
scarcity of seasonal labor. A study by Adam (1978) indicates that 
Gezira tenants find difficulty in meeting labor requirements, 
especially during peak seasons. 
Depending on the amount of water available in the irrigation 
canals and the amount and frequency of rainfall, the Scheme management 
determines the frequency and number of irrigations that each crop 
receives. Once more, tenants have no control on the amount of 
irrigation water nor the number of irrigations. 
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Most, if not all, farm planning studies conducted for the Gezira 
carry the basic assumption that farmers equate marginal cost to 
marginal revenue, an assumption which only holds true under conditions 
of risk neutrality. Risk, however, may have a seriously inhibiting 
effect on production since many farmers cannot afford to suffer a 
setback which might mean deprivation or even starvation. Hazel et al 
(198.2) state that to neglect consideration of risk behavior in 
agricultural models can lead to important overstatements of the output 
levels of risky enterprises, overly specialized cropping pattern, and 
biased estimates of the supply elasticities of individual commodities. 
Other consequences may be overestimation of the value of important 
resources, such as land and irrigation water, and incorrect 
predictions of technology choices. Given the fact that farmers in 
developing countries are generally risk averse, farm planning 
incorporating risk is essential for the Gezira Scheme. 
The Objectives of the Study 
The main objective of this study is to determine the optimum 
resource allocation and enterprise combination taking into account the 
product price and yield variation on irrigated Gezira farms. Data 
derived from sample information at farm and project level are used in 
a programming model to determine the optimum plan. 
The specific objectives are: 
1. To critically analyze the past and present performance of the 
project taking into account economic, social and institutional 
constraints. 
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2. To review literature on risk programming models with special 
reference to applications in developing countries. 
3. To determine the optimum farm resource and enterprise 
combination under conditions of risk neutrality and under conditions 
of minimizing risk or income variability for a given level of 
potential expected income. 
4. To analyze the sensitivity of the optimum plan to changes in 
borrowing limits for institutional credit, availability of seasonal 
hi red labor, irrigation water frequency and quantity constraints, and 
producer prices. 
Plan of Presentation 
The remaining text includes five chapters. Chapter II presents 
detailed information about the study area. A critical review of the 
project past and present performance is discussed. Economic, social 
and institutional constraints are presented and analyzed. 
Chapter III presents a selective literature review on risk 
programming models. Special consideration is devoted to applications 
of the models to developing countries. 
Chapter IV specifies the minimization of total absolute deviation 
(MOTAD) model used in this study and the corresponding assumptions and 
limitations. Detailed descriptions of the objective function, 
activities and constraints are presented. Sources of data and the 
method used to collect and analyze the data are also provided in this 
chapter. 
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In Chapter V application of the model is made to determine the 
optimum farm plan and resource combination. A set of efficient farm 
plans is identified along the computed efficiency frontier. 
Sensitivity of the optimum plan to changes in institutional credit 
limitations, hired labor availability, irrigation water, and producer 
prices is evaluated and discussed. 
Chapter VI provides a sullDllary of the results and findings of the 
specific model and the sensitivity analysis. The policy implications 
for future planning and resource allocation in the Gezira Scheme are 
discussed. Finally,_ suggestions for further research beyond the scope 
of this study are given. 
CHAPTER II 
THE EXISTING CONDITIONS IN THE GEZIRA SCHEME 
Background 
The Gezira Scheme is unique in Africa and described to be one of 
the largest gravity irrigation areas in the world. It extends over 
the central claylands between the Blue and White Niles covering an 
area of 2.2 million feddans (see Figure 1). The central claylands of 
the Sudan is described by the Food and Agricultural Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO, 1974) to be one of the largest agricultural 
reserves in the world and the potential breadbasket of Africa and the 
Middle East. The Gezira' s great size creates special problems in 
irrigation control but offers scope for economies of scale in farm 
operations. Its importance in the national economy and its impact 
upon the livelihood of over 96,000 farmers, their families and 
helpers, dictate that changes in agricultural policies and practices 
should only be made after careful consideration. 
Traditionally, prior to the irrigation network, the Gezira area 
was inhabited by nomadic and semi-nomadic pasturalists growing sorghum 
(Sorghum vulgare) and dukhn (Pennisetum Typoideum), two staple 
food crops, during the short rainy season and moving their herds in 
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search of water and grazing during the long, hot, dry season. The 
beginning of irrigation in Gezira dates back to 1907 when the British 
authority, which controlled Sudan at that time, realized the 
suitability of Gezira soil for growing Extra Long Stable (ELS) cotton 
needed for the Lancashire cotton mills in England (Barnett, 1977). 
Gaitskell (1959) who witnessed the creation of Gezira Scheme under the 
management of British commercial companies, represented by the Sudan 
Plantation Syndicate (SPS), reported that competition from the United 
States, Germany and even China pushed the British government to seek 
supplies of raw materials from overseas colonies, namely Egypt and 
Sudan. By 1925 a dam was constructed at Sennar across the Blue Nile 
and this put the Scheme into commercial production. 
Although cotton was the main crop produced in the Gezira, other 
crops such as sorghum, groundnut, wheat and vegetables were also 
grown. The area cultivated in Gezira gradually developed from 250 
feddans in 1907-08, to 88,000 feddans in 1925, to 1.14 million feddans 
in 1950-51 and, currently, to 2.1 million feddans. In 1950 the Scheme 
was nationalized and the Sudan Plantation Syndicate handed over 
control to the Sudan Gezira Board (SGB), a government controlled body, 
which still operates the Scheme. The largest single expansion to the 
project occurred in 1969-70 when the Managil extension added one 
mil lion feddans to production. The Managil extension was made 
possible by the 1959 Nile Water Agreement between Sudan and Egypt 
under which the Sudan's share of Nile water increased from four 
milliard cubic meters to 18.5 milliard cubic meters of the annual 
discharge measured at Aswan Dam. 
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Organizationally the project is divided into 14 groups and 105 
blocks. A group area ranges from 20,000 to 80,000 feddans and a block 
area varies from 20,000 to 40,000 feddans. The Scheme is administered 
centrally from Barakat, headquarters of the Gezira Scheme (refer to 
F i g u r e 1 ) • The or g an i z a t i on a 1 as p e c t s o f the pro j e ct wi 11 be 
discussed in more detail latter in this chapter. 
Currently the Scheme represents 12 percent of land under 
cultivation and more than half of the country's irrigated land. The 
share of Gezira Scheme in the Sudan's total production of cotton, 







SHARE OF GEZIRA SCHEME IN THE SUDAN'S TOTAL 
PRODUCTION OF SELECTED CROPS FOR 
SEASON 1982-83 
Sudan's Percentage 
Total Gezira Share of 
Production Production Gezira 
(Thousand Tons) (Thousand Tons) 
583 319 55 
141 94 67 
497 118 24 
1,964 130 7 




The cent r a 1 area of the Sudan is characterized by large expanses 
of clay plains extending over an area of 14,000 square kilometers. 
Gezira Scheme constitutes the most fertile portion of central 
claylands that lies between the Blue and the White Niles. Being 
impervious clay, the soil allows construction of canals which do not 
require expensive lining with concrete and water loss is minimum. The 
cont our 1 i nes slope gently from the upper Blue Nile downwards towards 
the north and west. This made the siting of the irrigation canals 
easy and facilitated the development of gravity irrigation. Further, 
a s 1 i gh t ridge runs from north to south along the eastern edge of the 
scheme. The main can a 1 s from Sennar dam follow the line of this 
ridge, thus giving good command over the whole area (Barnett, 1977). 
Land use in the 1982-83 season was determined largely by the 
volume of irrigation water available, rotational constraints to 
maintain soil fertility and crop disease, lack of monetary liquidity 
at the tenant level, and crop requirements for water. As presented in 
Table II cotton occupied the major share of area in the rotation 
accounting for 43 percent, followed by sorghum, the staple food crop, 
which occupied 28 percent of the cultivated land. Wheat, groundnut 
and vegetables accounted for 14 percent, 12 percent, and 3 percent, 
respectively of the cultivated area. 
TABLE II 
LAND USE BY CROP AND AVERAGE YIELD IN 
GEZIRA SCHEME FOR 1982-83 CROP YEAR 
Area Average Yield 
Crop Feddansa % of Total Tons/Fed. 
Cotton 484,315 43 0.671 
Wheat 155,533 14 0.694 
Groundnuts 148, 182 12 1.200 
Sorghum 320,940 28 0.523 
Vegetables 28, 774 3 N.A. 
b 
al Feddan = 1.038 acres= 0.42 hectare. 
b 
N.A. - not available. 
Source: Sudan Gezira Board, the Gezira Current Statistics (1982-83). 
Labor Use 
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The latest statistics available on aggregate labor force in the 
Gezira Scheme were estimated by Adam (1978) at 666,715 laborers. This 
figure accounted for 25 percent of the total labor force working in 
the public agricultural sector in the Sudan. The tenant and his 
family provide only one third of the total labor used on the farm 
while the rest is contributed by permanent and seasonal employment. 
The low farm family contribution to field work is attributed to low 
farm returns and lack of cash liquidity necessary to meet the urgent, 
15 
day to day, family needs. The amount of tenant labor contributed is 
not uniform among families and varies inversely with tenant assets and 
off-farm income. The increasingly attractive opportunities in the 
urban market have in fact led to a substantial rural to urban 
migration. 
Hired labor constitutes nearly half the production expenses for 
all crops except wheat which is almost fully mechanized by Scheme 
management for national policy reasons. Cotton picking alone requires 
about 65 percent of the total labor used. 
Following the organizational structure in the Gezira Scheme, the 
tenant is responsible for the provision of labor on his tenancy. 
Management assumes that the tenant is able to provide the majority of 
the labor input to his own tenancy from his own family. The only 
exception is during peak labor periods such as sowing and harvesting. 
Since the demand for hired labor is high while the supply is limited, 
the labor wage is bid up and frequently constitutes a production 
bottleneck given the tenants weak financial position. 
Survey results among 50 Gezira.tenants revealed that a critical 
labor shortage problem existed. Sixty percent of the tenants 
interviewed reported the loss of up to 25 percent of the crop due to 
labor shortage. Sudan Gezira Board statistics estimated the shortage 
in cotton picking labor for season 1981-82 at 43,805 laborers or 11 
percent of the total required labor. Other sources (Euroconsultant, 
1982), argue that there is no labor shortage in absolute terms, 
however, there are problems in attracting adequate labor at the right 
time and at rates the tenants can afford. 
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Water Resource Use 
Water for the Gezira Scheme is diverted from the Blue Nile at 
Sennar Dam ( see Figure 1). Availability is fixed by the Nile Water 
Agreement of 1959 between Sudan and Egypt. According to the terms of 
the Agreement, the Sudan's annual share of the Nile water is 18. 5 
milliard cubic meters or 25 percent of the-net discharge measured at 
Aswan Dam in Egypt (Waterburg, 1979). Allowing for transit losses and 
evaporation, this corresponds to an annual total of 20.55 milliard 
cubic meters available at Sennar. At present, the water allocation 
for the existing irrigation projects in the Sudan is 15.951 milliard 
cubic meters per annum of which the share of the Gezira is 7.563 
milliard. With the existing planning horizon, requirements for 
further development are estimated at 3.03 and 8.10 milliard cubic 
meters in 1990 and 2000, respectively (Ministry of Irrigation, 1979). 
This implies that after 1990 a serious water shortage problem may 
exist in the Sudan. 
In the Gezira Scheme, the water supply at the field level is 
determined by the existing capacity of the irrigation canals rather 
than by amount of water available at the dam level. This is because 
the irrigation canals are heavily infested with weeds and silt. 
Actually, the canal clearance situation has been deteriorating during 
the last decade due to shortages in canal clearing equipment. During 
the period 1972/73 through 1982/83, the percentage of silt removal 
averaged SO percent of the amount needed to be removed. 
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The system which supplies irrigation water to the Gezira Scheme 
comprises two main canals diverted from the dam at Sennar. At 
intervals, water is taken from the main canal and conducted to a major 
canal. Each major canal in turn feeds a set of minor canals, and each 
minor canal provides water for the fields where cultivation is carried 
out. A minor canal feeds water to a set of fields of 90 feddans each, 
known as Numbers. The water is taken out of the minor canal through a 
channe 1 known as "Abu ishreen", which feeds a complete Number. Each 
Number is further subdividied into tenancies and each tenancy is fed 
by small channels called "Abu sitta". 
The irrigation water flows to the field from the dam based upon a 
calculation of the total requirements at any point in time. 
Calculations are made on a Block by Block basis by the field staff. 
The water can take as long as four days to travel from the dam to a 
field in the northern part of the Scheme. The field staff belongs to 
the Sudan Gezira Board while the irrigation engineers work for the 
Ministry of Irrigation. Lack of effective communication between the 
Sudan Gezira Board staff and Ministry of Irrigation staff has 
contributed significantly to the water shortage problems at the field 
level. The communication problem has been basically attributed to the 
absence of proper coordination and deteriorating telephone services. 
The length of the major tributaries and drains in the Gezira Scheme is 
12,674 kilometers (Ministry of Irrigation, 1979). Such a large 
irrigation network requires highly trained personnel and 
well-organized and coordinated system. 
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Agricultural Production System 
Land Tenure 
The land tenure systems are similar in most public agricultural 
schemes in Sudan, however, there are slight variations in the size of 
the holdings~ For the Gezira Schem,~, the government reserved its 
right to either purchase or rent the land within the scheme 
boundaries. Having been purchased,or rented, the land was 
redistributed to the tenants with a priority in allotments given first 
to the former landowner, then second to the residents in the area. 
The standard tenancy size in the Gezira was set at 40 feddans. 
However, over time this size has been reduced. A survey by Ahmed 
(1977) shows a substantial reduction in tenancy size with 82.5 percent 
of the tenants in Gezira holding 20 feddans or less. The standard 
size of the tenancy in the Managil extension is 15 feddans. 
Since the land is owned by the government, the government, 
represented by Sudan Gezira Board, preserves the right to terminate 
tenancy if the tenant is not capable of fulfilling his obligations. 
The other common feature is that all tenants follow a particular crop 
rotation set by the Agricultural Research Corporation and approved by 
the Gezira management. 
The main crops grown in the Gezira Scheme are cotton, wheat, 
groundnut and sorghum (Table III). Vegetables are grown on a small 
scale around the villages. The Scheme is divided equally into Main 
Gezira and the Managil extension (see Figure 1). Each division 
constitutes nearly half the cultivated area. 
TABLE III 
CROP ROTATION PER TENANCY AND SEASON 
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The main crops are cultivated in the Gezira in a crop rotation of 
cotton, wheat, groundnut, sorghum and fallow. The crop rotation 
include cotton, wheat, groundnut and sorghum in the Managil Extension. 
Crop rot at ion per tenancy and season in Gezira and Mangi 1 is shown in 
Table III. Rotations are necessary to conserve soil fertility and 
prevent the carryover of diseases and pests from one year to the next. 
Cotton Production 
The varieties of cotton grown in the Gezira Scheme were made 
available through the Agricultural Research Corporation which has been 
fairly successful in developing new strain of cotton adapted to local 
environmental conditions. Land preparation, aimed at weed control and 
the establishment of a good seed bed, is limited by 
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shortages of machinery and pesticides. Fertilization of cotton is 
confined to urea which is manually broadcasted at a recommended rate 
of 80 kg/feddan in main Gezira and 120 kg/feddan in Managil Extension 
where there is no fallow. Insecticide applications are commonly done 
by aircraft at intervals from October to February. Number of 
waterings range from 8 to 12 and the amount of water applied is 
estimated at 3,552 cubic meters per feddan (Fakki, 1982). 
Despite the technology intensification efforts since the early 
1970s, statistics reveal a decline in cotton yield from·an average of 
0.693 tons per feddan in early 1970s to 0.518 in the early 1980s. 
Variability in cotton yield has been a major problem facing producers, 
research specialists and the Board administrators. The yield 
variability problem has a serious impact not only at the producer 
level but also at the macroeconomic level since cotton is a major 
foreign currency earner. 
Several agronomic and socio-economic factors contribute 
significantly to the variability problem. Among agronomic factors, 
sowing date and rotation are important. Cotton sowing dates range 
from July 25 to mid-August. Early sowing tends to reduce fluctuations 
in yield while late sowing reduces total yield. In the rotation, 
cotton preceded by sorghum has the most depressing effect on soil 
fertility and hence productivity of cotton. This is because both 
cotton and sorghum are nitrogen depletors. In addition, peasant 
farmers seldom follow the recommendations of research with respect to 
seed rate and spacing. This is because sowing is usually performed 
manually in the Gezira Scheme. Other factors contributing to yield 
variability are irrigation water timing and frequency and labor 
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availability, particularly during weeding and picking seasons. 
Fluctuations in yields of cotton and other field crops over time are 
presented in figure 2. 
The f 1 u c t u a t i on s in co t t on pr 1. c e s has n a t i on a 1 as we 11 as 
international dimensions. Cotton is an important international 
commodity which is influenced by the world supply and demand 
conditions. Since Sudan is not a major producer of cotton in the 
world market, it can hardly influence the world market price. In 
general, the world cotton market has been adversely influenced by the 
syntheses of man-made fibers since the early 1950s. According to FAQ 
Commodity Review and Outlook, the current and short term prospects in 
cotton marketing are not very encouraging. FAQ (1983) reports that 
the competitive position of cotton is unlikely to improve in the 
foreseeable future as the downward pressures on prices are expected to 
continue and prices of manmade fibers are expected to remain low. At 
the national level cotton price fluctuations have contributed to not 
only low, but also destabilizing country and farm incomes. The 
over al 1 result is the farmer vicious cycle: low and fluctuating 
cotton yields result in low and unstable incomes so tenants spend less 
on weeding, irrigation and picking and frequently look for off-farm 
sources of income. Fluctuations in gross margins for cotton and other 
crops for the Gezira scheme are represented in Figure 3. 
Wheat Production 
Because of national objectives aimed at saving foreign exchange 
and providing food security, the Sudan Gezira Board includes wheat as 
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of wheat under Gezira conditions is low, with an average of 0.4 
tons If eddan. Wheat productivity is limited by water competition with 
other crops, especially cotton, and by inadequate machinery to perform 
timely land preparation and sowing. Survey results among Gezira 
tenants show that wheat is a very attractive crop to the tenants 
despite its low productivity and net revenues for two reasons: (1), 
wheat is the only crop in the rotation which is completely financed by 
the Scheme management; and (2) tenants are allowed to keep two sacks, 
100 kilograms each, for family consumption and hand over the rest of 
the crop to the Scheme management. Further, irrigation is the only 
manual operation performed by the tenant in wheat cultivation. 
Sorghum Production 
Sorghum is widely regard-e-d as the most important staple food crop 
in Gez i r a. However, the tenant has to rely on his own financial 
resources to raise the crop because the Sudan Gezira Board takes no 
part in financing the crop. Almost all the materials, machinery and 
labor inputs are provided by the tenants, either from their own or 
from outside sources and the produce is privately marketed. Sorghum 
yields are generally low because the crop is grown with minimal land 
preparation and without herbicides, insecticides or ·fertilizers. 
Unlike wheat, Gezira has a comparative advantage in producing sorghum 
and the residents have suffic-ient skill and know-how to raise the crop 
but lack credit. 
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Groundnut Production 
Like sorghum, groundnut production is completely financed by the 
tenant. Lack of liquidity and access to improved production inputs 
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resu 1 t in fluctuating but relatively high yields (Figure 2). Gibbons 
(1975) reported that the environmental and geographical conditions are 
favorable for groundnut production in the Gezira Scheme. He further 
argued that despite the absence of satisfactory marketing institutions 
and facilities such as for grading and storage, marketing prospects at 
the national and international levels are believed to be promising. 
At present, th~ government policy aims at drastic reduction in 
groundnut production in the Gezira Scheme, primarily for the purpose 
of making room for expanded wheat production. But groundnut does not 
seem to compete with wheat, neither in terms of land nor in water use, 
because the two crops are grown in two different seasons (Table III). 
Vegetable Production 
Vege tab 1 e growing is the complete responsibility of the tenant. 
Despite the fact that it is labor-intensive, many tenants prefer to 
grow vegetables on a crop-sharing basis. Onion, tomato, okra, 
cucumber and sweet potato are popular vegetables in Gezira. In 
genera 1 vegetables, especially onion, have relatively high income per 




The credit system in the Gezira Scheme 1s characterized by a 
marked dualism between institutional credit provided by the Sudan 
Gezira Board and the Agricultural Bank of Sudan, and the informal 
credit market consisting of localized transactions of money, goods and 
services among local merchants and moneylenders. The latter is 
referred to under Sudan conditions as "Sheil" system which is 
basically cash loans to be repaid in kind and involve an effective 
annual interest rate estimated by Ahmed (1977) to range between 115 to 
280 percent. 
Cotton, and recently wheat, have the highest priority for Sudan 
Gezira Board credit. Both ~'re regarded as national crops and almost 
75 percent of cotton expenses and 90 percent of wheat expenses are 
directly financed by the Scheme management. The management undertakes 
the marketing of both cotton and wheat, deducts the loans and pays the 
balance to the tenant farmers immediately after harvest. Because of 
the low productivity of wheat under Gezira conditions, the crop may 
fai I to repay the debt. The wheat debt is usually deducted from 
cotton proceeds, a factor which obviously discourages cotton 
production and increases tenant debt. 
To finance the tenant's advance payments, the Sudan Gezira Board 
borrows from the Sudan Central Bank at an interest rate ranging from 9 
to 15 percent (Ahmed, 1983). In the Gezira Scheme, the role of the 
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Agricultural Bank of Sudan is to supplement the Sudan Gezira Board 
credit activities by providing short term loans to the tenant farmers 
for the product ion of cash crops other than cotton and wheat, namely 
groundnuts and vegetables. Because the tenant farmers in the Gezira 
do not possess the necessary collateral to be eligible for the 
Agricultural Bank loans, cooperative societies were established for 
the distribution and collection of the Agricultural Bank loans. 
However, due to inefficient management, corruption and disloyalty of 
the members, the cooperative failed to repay more than 39 percent of 
the loans (Ahmed, 1977) and this eventually led to a complete 
termination of Agricultural Bank loans. 
Inadequacy and deficiencies of the institutional credit system in 
Gezira has led to the spread of informal agricultural credit systems. 
Obviously, the Gezira tenant-·was left with no option but to resort to 
private traders and village moneylenders to secure credit for crops 
other than cotton and wheat. Social and ceremonial obligations 
imposed by custom and religion make a heavy drain on the limited 
earnings of the tenant (Ahmed, 1983). Frequently the need for 
children's education, medical care and other domestic obligations 
requires the provision of cash. Institutional sources of finance are 
not available to the tenant for such social needs and thus forces him 
to borrow from the private moneylender. 
The practice of share cropping in part stems from the inadequacy 
of liquidity to meet peak crop resource requirements for groundnut and 
vegetables. The share-cropping system has become an important tool 
for the tenants to secure labor on noncash basis. According to the 
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field survey results, five percent of the tenants interviewed resort 
to this system because even the moneylenders are very reluctant to 
finance crops like vegetables since vegetables are labor-intensive and 
subject to risk arising from fluctuations in yield and prices. 
Research and Extension 
All agricultural research is entrusted to the Agricultural 
Research Corporation which is a national research agency financed 
directly from government funds. Substantial efforts are devoted to 
development of new varieties and practices. However, most of the 
technical information is not tested on a Scheme-wide basis, 
consequently there is little feedback from tenants to the research 
station. 
The Extension Deparl:1'llent of the Sudan Gezira Board was 
established in 1969. Its functions are basically to disseminate 
agricultural, social, vocational, and health information to the 
tenants. At present, the department carries out little testing under 
field conditions and organizes lectures, demonstrations and extension 
tips through the regional rural television station. Since electricity 
service is provided to about 10 percent of the villages in the Gezira 
Scheme and few tenants own TV sets, the effect of such TV extension 
services is minimal. 
At present, coordination between researchers and extension 
agents, both in defining the research program and in transmitting 
research results to the farmers, is almost nonexistent. Survey 
results show that 90 percent of the tenants interviewed did not 
29 
benefit from the extension program. In addition, there seems to be a 
marked communication gap between extension agents and the majority of 
the farmers. This gap is attributable to the prevalence of illiteracy 
among farmers and shortage of extension staff and communication 
facilities. 
Marketing Services 
Cotton marketing is performed by the Cotton Public Corporation 
(CPC), which receives cotton lint immediately after ginning. The CPC 
is an official government body controlling all internal and external 
s a 1 es of cotton lint in the country. The terms under which cotton is 
offered for s a 1 e have varied over time. Currently the CPC announces 
opening fixed prices, normally at the beginning of each season, on the 
basis of which competitiv-e bids are received on lots of specified 
quantities. Bids are in U.S. dollars and the payment has to be made 
by irrevocable letter of credit at the time of shipment or some other 
specified date. An important issue which is related to cotton 
marketing policy is related to the fixing of prices. According to the 
World Bank report (1979), generally the Sudanese cotton is priced at 
between 60 to 70 percent of the comparable Egyptian varieties. In 
periods of low supplies, Sudan would tend to narrow its Fice 
differentials with Egypt while in periods of high stock it reduces its 
relative price. For this reason, Sudanese cotton is subject to 
variations of price, which in turn, affect the producers and the 
government revenues. 
Since 1970 the marketing of groundnut has been monopolized by the 
government through the Sudan Oilseeds Company (SOC). But the 
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activities of this company are oriented towards the external 
operations, leaving the internal markets for wholesale traders. The 
traders tend to regard the minimum prices declared by the SOC as 
maximum prices, making quality a tool of negotiation. The major 
shortcomings of the policy of the oilseed company is that it is not 
flexible to match the day to day fluctuations in prices and lacks 
efficient transportation, storage and processing facilities. In 
Gezira, the bulk of groundnut production is handled by village 
merchants and moneylenders as repayment for cash advances to tenants. 
The tenant is hurt first by an inefficient public marketing policy and 
second by high interest rates of the moneylender. 
The official marketing channels for wheat are the authorized 
wheat mills scattered at different locations in the Scheme. Each 
season the Sudan Gezira B(?;ird announces a fixed price per ton and 
tenants are obliged to hand their production of wheat over to the 
specified mills. Failure to obey this order may result in termination 
of rights to grow wheat in the future. The free market price is 
usually higher than the official declared price and a large proportion 
of the crop is smuggled to the free market. For sorghum, since it is 
an important staple food crop, many tenants would prefer to keep it. 
The surplus, if any, is marketed through village merchants and usually 
consumed locally by landless residents. 
Vegetable growers rely on the local market to sell their produce, 
and to· a lesser extent on nearby central markets. Buyers are usually 
wholesalers or retailers pay cash on the spot. In general, the 
produce is marketed unsorted and varying considerably in quality. 
Prices are subject to significant fluctuations due to irregular 
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produce consignments and related speculations. The lack of timely 
collection and dissemination of information on prices and supply and 
demand in local and alternative markets have undoubtedly contributed 
to the price instability in the study area. 
The Rehabilitation Project 
Due to a series of adverse developments such as worsening 
economic conditions, growing backlogs in machinery replacement and 
maintenance, water management problems and competing employment 
opportunities outside the Scheme, the performance of the Scheme has 
been seriously impaired. In June 1979, a joint FAO-IBRD mission 
visited Sudan for the purpose of identifying the Gezira Scheme's 
urgent needs for rehabi 1 i tat ion and modernization. The mission 
identified what is called the· 'Rehabilitation and Modernization Project 
to satisfy the following objectives: 
1. To increase production of all crops, particularly export 
crops, with the aim of realizing a minimum average increase of seven 
percent per year during the decade 1980-1990. 
2. To improve crop mix in order to maximize the economic returns 
of the project within the framework of the primary objectives of 
improving both tenant incomes and government revenues. 
3. To upgrade the productive capacity of the project in terms of 
staff, machinery, and other facilities to a level compatible with the 
demands of high cropping intensity and high productivity. 
• 
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4. To evaluate the administrative organization of the Sudan 
Gezira Board with a view to improving efficiency and performance. 
5. To study the present distribution of the individual tenancy 
income and to suggest ways and means to improve the tenants' net share 
of income from crop production. 
The mission proposed that the rehabilitation and modernization of 
the Scheme be carried out in two stages, each five years in length. 
The first stage, Project I, is directed toward strengthening 
agricultural operations and restoring irrigation water supply to 
increase the current production levels. The second stage, Project II, 
would place emphasis on the modernizing the irrigation system, 
upgrading of technological levels in agricultural operations and 
improving the social and health services. A detailed feasibility 
study was conducted in 1981 ·by a group of international and national 
consulting firms. Based on the feasibility study results the 
In terna t ion a 1 Development Association and the European Development 
Fund provided a credit of U.S. $76 million under the Agricultural 
Rehab i 1 it at ion Project for investment in the public irrigated sector 
of the Sudan. Of this credit, U.S. $36.8 million has been allotted to 
the Gezira Scheme for the procurement of urgently needed equipment and 
spare parts. As prerequisites for the program two institutional 
changes took place in the season 1980-81: (1) replacement of crop 
sharing arrangements by a land and water charge, and (2) announcement 
of cotton prices early in the season and payment to tenants as soon 
as picked cotton is received by the Sudan Gezira Board. Other 
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prioi:ities in the rehabilitation program are not yet specified, 
however, and it wi 11 take at least five years before the results of 
the program can be evaluated and analyzed properly. 
CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL TECHNIQUES 
FOR ENTERPRISE SELECTION IN A RISKY 
ENVIRONMENT 
Theoretical Framework 
Direct Elicitation of Utility Functions 
The foundation of the expected utility theorem goes back to 
Daniel Bernoulli who as early as 1738 suggested that the optimal 
behavior of the decision maker is that which maximizes expected 
ut i 1 it y. Bernoulli assumed that utility is cardinally measurable and 
that the decision maker should maximize his expected utility. 
Typically, the Bernoullian decision theory is defined by Dillon (1971) 
as follows: 
Bernoullian decision theory is a normative approach to risky 
choice based upon the decision maker's personal strength of 
belief (or subjective probabilities) about the occurrence of 
uncertain events and personal valuation (or utility) of 
potential consequences (p. 4). 
Following this definition, the expected utility model provides a 
single-valued index which orders action choices according to the 
preferences or attitudes of the decision maker. In 1944, Von Neuman 
and Morgenstern demonstrated that the utility concept follows 
logically a set of assumptions or axioms about individual behavior. 
The set of axioms is summarized as follows: 
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1. Ordering of choices: For any two action choices, A1 and 
A2 , the decision maker either prefers A1 to A2 , prefers A2 to 
A1 , or is indifferent between them. 
2. Transitivity among choices: If A1 is preferred to A2 , 
and A2 is preferred to A3 , then A1 must be preferred to A3 • 
3. Substitution among choices: If A1 is preferred to A2 , 
and A3 is some other choice, then a risky choice pA1 + (1-p)A3 
is preferred to another risky choice pA2 + (1-p)A3 , where p is the 
probability of occurrence. 
4. Certainty equivalent among choices: If A1 is preferred to 
A2 , and A2 is preferred to A3 , then some probability p exists 
that the dee is ion maker is indifferent to having A2 , for certain or 
receiving A1 with probability p and A3 with probability (1-p). 
Thus A2 is the certainty equivalent of pA1 + (l-p)A3 • 
According to Bernoulli's principle, if a decision maker obeys 
these axioms, there exists a utility function U(A) which reflects the 
dee is ion maker's preference among different alternative outcomes. If 
the alternative outcomes represent different levels of income Z, then 
the result is a utility function of income U(Z). When enough utility 
values are available from repeated gambling questions, a utility index 
or function can be fitted to these values using graphical or 
statistical procedures. Graphically, a farmer's attitude toward risk 
is inferred from the shape of his utility function. As presented in 
Figure 4, a function concave to the origin implies risk aversion, a 
linear utility function implies risk neutrality, and a convex function 
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utility function with both concave and convex segments indicating 
changes in risk attitudes for different monetary outcomes. 
An important characteristic of the utility function is that they 
are monotonically increasing, i.e., if z1 > z2 implies U(z1 )> 
The implication of increasing monotonicity is the 
neoclassical axiom that more income is preferred to less, i.e., 
au I az > 0. A 1 though the first derivative of the utility function 
is positive, the second derivative may be negative (a 2u/az2 < 0), 
zero ( a2 u/az 2 = 0), or positive (a 2 u/az 2 > 0) which implies 
that the marginal utility of extra income is decreasing, constant or 
increasing. As shown in Figure 4, farmers with such utility functions 
are characterized as risk averse, risk neutral or risk prefering, 
respectively. 
Despite the fact that the Bernou 11 ian Principle implies the 
existence of U(Z), it tells nothing of its precise form, nor does the 
dee is ion maker intuitively know the algebraic form of his utility 
function. Dillon (1971) argued that a variety of different functional 
forms may suit such as polynomial, logrithmic or exponetial utility 
functions. However, he recommended using the functions that provide 
simplest manipulation. 
Direct elicitation of the utility functions has been emphasized 
in a series of studies (Officer and Halter, 1968; Lin, Dean and Moore, 
1974; Halter and Mason, 1978; Dillon and Scandizzo, 1978; Hildreth and 
Knowles, 1982). This approach, however, has been criticized as 
subject to bi as from different interviewers, preference for specific 
probabilities, negative preference towards gambling, absence of 
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realism in the game setting, lack of time and experience of the 
participants to become familiar with the hypothetical choices, and 
compounding of errors in the elicitation process (Roumasset, 1979). 
Furthermore, studies by Binswanger (1980) and Dillon and Scandanizzo 
(1978) have indicated that eliciting individual farmer's utility 
functions are expensive, time consuming, and may not be stable over 
time because they vary with the socioeconomic status of the household. 
Hazell (1982) stated: 
It seems unlikely that direct elicitation will ever be a 
widely adopted approach in farm advisory work. A more 
practical approach has proved to be the derivation of a 
number of farm plans in the efficient E-V set, and to 
present these to the farmer for his choice (p. 386). 
For the purpose of this scudy, the E-V approach was assumed tcrbe 
relevant. The following_discussion presents and analyzes the E-V 
efficiency frontier approach. 
Mean-Variance Efficiency Criteria 
Both quadratic and linear risk programming provide paths to 
estimate the E-V efficiency frontier. The approach is widely used in 
whole farm planning models incorporating risk. It is based on the 
fol lowing assumptions: (a) the farm decision maker views the outcome 
of any production activity in probablistic terms meaning that net 
return or gross margin is considered to have a probability 
distribution which is normally distributed (Anderson, et al, 1977); 
( b) in ass es sing the desirability of alternative combinations of farm 
activities the decision maker holds preference among farm plans solely 
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on the basis of their expected income E and variance of expected 
income V. Therefore his preference can be represented by the 
following quadratic utility function: 
U = U(E, V) (3.1) 
The utility indifference curves derived from Equation 3.1 are 
assumed to be convex with positive slopes. This means that farmers 
are risk averters, i.e. increasing levels of expected income are 
necessary to offset higher levels of risk bearing. 
Other assumptions required to insure that the i_so-utility curves 
for the farm firm decision maker exhibit the convexity property are: 
(a) higher expected incomes are preferred to lower incomes, ceteris 
paribus; (b) a low variance is preferred to a high variance for a 
given level of expected income; and (c) there is a diminishing 
marginal rate of substitution between the expected level and variance 
of income. The first two assumptions guarantee the positive slope of 
the isoutility curves and the third assumption implies that the 
iso-utility curves will be convex as depicted in Figure 5. In terms 
of calculus the relationships in Figure 5 can be stated as follows: 
1. au/av< o 
2. au/aE > o 
3. aE/av > o 
i.e., the expected utility will decrease 
with an increase in risk. 
i.e., the expected utility increases 
with an increase in expected 
income. 
i.e., the farmer would prefer a farm 
plan with higher V if, and only 












Figure 5. The E-V Efficiency Frontier and the Optimum Farm 
Plan 
40 
4. i.e., the compensation in (3) would have 
to increase at an increasing rate 
with increases in risk. 
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Further discussion on the above relationships is presented by Sharp 
(1963), Johnson (1968) and Hazell (1971). 
As shown in Figure 5, the upper bound 0Q of the feasible set is 
the efficiency frontier. The feasible set is bounded above since net 
revenues from production activities have finite means and variances. 
Each point lying on the upper bound 0Q corresponds to the highest 
level of expected income attainable for each level of income variance. 
From the behavioral assumptions concerning the iso-utility 
curves, one can conclude that only farm plans having·means and 
variances which lie on the efficiency frontier are expected to be 
potential choices for the decision maker. Every alternative plan 
whose expected income and variance is given by a point interior to OQ 
is dominated by an alternative which has the same variance but a 
higher expected income or the same expected income and a lower 
variance. For example, in Figure 5 point R is dominated by point P 
and point S. Point R has the same variance as point P, however, point 
P has greater expected income. Similarly, point R has the same 
expected income as S but S has lower variance than R. It follows that 
the E-V efficiency frontier can be defined as the locus of all 
efficient farm plans encountered with the lowest variance for any 
given income or the highest income for any given variance. Point Q on 
the efficiency frontier represents the result from the deterministic 
profit maximizing solution where the decision maker is assumed to be 
risk neutral. A rational farmer who is averse to risk and his 
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utility preference corresponds to the utility function, I 1 shown on 
Figure 5, would select the farm plan represented by point P along the 
efficiency frontier. 
• Despite its wide applicability and acceptability as a planning 
tool for farmers under risk, the E-V efficiency criteria is associated 
with some problems. The decision maker is assumed to be everywhere 
risk averse. When this assumption does not hold, the preferred choice 
may be excluded from the E-V efficient set. In addition, the 
assumption of normal distribution of outcomes may not be relevant 
given the skewness of agri cu 1 tu ra 1 yields and incomes (King and 
Robinson, 1981). 
Probability of Loss Function 
A definition of risk that is widely applied in the literature, 
explains risk as a "chance of loss" or the probability (a) that net 
income (II) will fall below some critical or disaster level (d). 
Mathematically the definition can be expressed as: 
Pr( II < d) = a (3. 2) 
This definition relates to the "safety-first" models developed by 
Roy (1952), Tels er (1956), Baumol (1963), and Pyle and Turnovsky 
(1970). It specifies that a decision maker first satisfies a 
preference for "safety" in organizing a firm's activities, and then 
fo 11 ows a profit oriented course of action. The following discussion 
represents a probability of loss function criterion proposed by 
Baumol. 
Baumol (1963) criticized the E-V approach on the ground that many 
alternative farm plans along the efficiency frontier may be confusing 
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to the decision-maker. In addition, plans which do not provide a high 
probability of meeting minimum level of income are likely to be 
rejected by farm decision-makers. For example, assume a farmer's 
minimum acceptable level of income is $1,000. Therefore only farm 
plans which generate this income level, at a reasonably high level of 
probability, are considered in the probability of loss analysis. 
Bau mo 1' s er it i c ism was based on expected gain confidence limits 
for portfolio selection. The model can be defined as a set of 
confidence statements about achieving various levels of income. The 
income from every efficient plan is assumed to be normally distributed 
with mean E and variance V. The basic assumption is that the rational 
decision maker can base his choice for a particular plan on the 
expected income and the minimum acceptable level of income which could 
be obtained from that plan, with a given degree of probability. To 
compute the critical income level d*, for every level of expected 




E - KS> d* a 
(3. 3) 
(3.4) 
d* is the critical level of inc.ome; E is the level of expected income; 
S is the standard deviation of income; and K is a factor from the 
standard normal density function taken at the desired probability 
level ci. 
The criterion is described in Figure 6. The expected value of 
income E of various efficient plans is presented on the horizontal 
axis. The vertical axis represents the values of E - KS 






Figure 6. Probability of Loss Function Associated with 
Certain Probability Level 
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with the E-V analysis are efficient, it can be demonstrated that the 
decision maker may readily reject some of them. For example, he will 
generally prefer farm plan A to farm plan B because EA> EB and 
(EA - Ka.SA)> (EB - Ka.S 8 ). That is, farm plan A offers both a 
higher expected income (E) and a higher floor of income (d*). 
However, a r.3tional decision maker would have to choose the farm plan 
corresponding to point M since at M he can achieve a higher expected 
income and more safety (higher d*) at the same probability level. In 
addition to making this single-valued suggestion, presenting bands for 
different probability levels would allow the decision maker to have a 
wide choice and hence a satisfactory level of enterprise combination 
which maximizes expected income subject to a minimum critical level of 
income. 
Empirical Techniques 
Quadratic Risk Programming 
Markowitz (1959) provided a valuable decision criterion for 
selecting efficient portfolios in a quadratic programming framework. 
He described an efficient portfolio as one with maximum expected 
return (E) and minimum variance (V), or one with the minimum variance 
for a given expected return. In matrix notation the quadratic 
programming model is typically formulated as: 








AX < B 
X > 0 
a set of activity levels, 
expected returns associated with 
resource restrictions, 
the variance covariance matrix of 





( 3. 7) 
In the model, ;\ is varied parametrically to derive the efficient 
E-V frontier. When ;\ = 0, or CJ= 0, the problem is reduced to a 
1 inear program. The risk aversion parameter represents the decision 
maker's risk attitude. If the decision maker is risk neutral,;\= 0 
and expected income is maximized. As the risk aversion coefficient 
parametrically increases, risk becomes increasingly important and more 
diversified risk efficient farm plans are identified. Any farm plan 
that is not on the risk efficiency frontier is not a risk efficient 
farm plan. 
The application of quadratic programming to risk analysis in 
agriculture was introduced by Freund (1956). He demonstrated how a 
conventional linear programming model could be extended to incorporate 
income variance and covariances to determine the E-V efficiency 
frontier. Similar to equation (3.5), Freund's model incorporated a 
risk aversion parameter in the quadratic portion of the objective 
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function. -Subsequently, examples include studies by How and Hazell 
(1968); Scott and Baker (1972); Lin, Dean and Moore (1974); and Adams, 
Menkhus and Woolery (1980). 
The quadratic programming model offers considerable potential in 
farm planning under risk. However, some limitations are often cited 
which constrain its use. The choice of the risk aversion coefficient 
is arbitrary, yet critical for determining a risk efficient farm plan. 
Brink and Mccarl ( 1978) provided an alternative solution by varying 
the risk aversion parameter until the difference between a farmer's 
actual plan and a farm plan on the efficient frontier is minimized. 
Other limitations include lack of accurate data on income variances 
and covariances and difficulties with quadratic programming alogrithms 
(Anderson, et al, 1977). 
To overcome the above difficulties, extensions have been made to 
the basic linear programming model by incorporating risk in the 
elements of the objective function. The empirical technique 
incorporating this development is reviewed below. 
Linear Risk Programming 
Linear risk programming models have been developed to account for 
the stochastic nature in agricultural production activity. These 
approaches include the incorporation of game-theory decision criteria 
into programming formulations (Mciner.ney, 1969); constraints on 
maximum admissible loss programming (Boussard and Petit, 1967); 
multistage linear programming with marginal risk constraints (Chen and 
Baker, 1974); development of MOTAD (Minimization of Total Absolute 
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Deviation) by Hazel (1971); and MOTAD with RINOCCO (Risky Input-Output 
Coefficients) developed by Wicks and Guise (1978). 
Hazell (1971) demonstrated that the MOTAD model produces a set of 
efficient farm plans closely similar to the quadratic solution and may 
offer cost and computational advantages. The key concept in Hazell's 











A = an unbiased estimator of the population mean absolute 
income.deviation, 
s = the number of years of sample observations, 
n = the number of activities, 
Chj = the gross margin (gross returns per acre minus total 
• b 1 ) f .. th . . varia e cos ts per acre or the J activity on the 
hth year, 
the sample margin for the 
.th 
activity, g. = mean gross J 
J 
x. the level of the .th activity. = J 
J 
Hazell argued that since s is constant then sA can be minimized, 
which is the total absolute income deviation, abbreviated as A. Using 
A as a measure of risk it is possible to define the set of efficient 
E-A farm plans as those having minimum mean absolute income deviation 
for any expected income level E. He further converts A to a linear 
programming objective function by minimizing only the absolute values 
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of the negative total gross margin deviations. The final mathematical 
formulation of the MOTAD model is as follows: 
s 




Subject to: E (Chj-gj) X.+yh > 0 
j=l J -
(for h = 1,2, ••• ,s) (3.10) 
n 
and E f. X. ;\ ( = 0 to unbounded) (3.11) 
j=l J J 
ti. 
E a .. X. < b. (for 1 = 1,2, ••• ,m) (3.12) 
j=l l.J J l. 
x.' 
J 
yh .c 0 (for all hand j) (3.13) 
where: 
yh = absolute valu~s of the negative total gross margin 
deviations, 
n = number of activities in the basic linear programming 
model, 




the sample margin for the .th activity, = mean gross J 
f. 
J 
the expected margin of the 
.th 
activity, = gross J 
;\ = the expected total gross margin. 
The MO TAD approach has been used in several studies. Brink and 
McCarl (1978) applied a modified model to draw inferences about 
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farmers risk aversion based on the difference between a farms' actual 
plan and what the model predicts. Mapp et al (1979) specified a MOTAD 
model for a typical farm in Southwestern Oklahoma to evaluate the 
effects of a 1 t erna ti v e economic futures. Gebremeskel and Shumway 
( 1979) developed a MOTAD model to evaluate risk-reducing forage and 
cattle management strategies. Persaud and Mapp (1980) applied a MOTAD 
model to evaluate risk management strategies for Oklahoma farmers. 
The strategies included forward contracting of wheat sales and wheat 
storage, and subsequent periodic sale on a monthly basis throughout 
the year. Salem and Badger (1983) used a MOTAD model to examine risk 
and uncertainty in farm planning when using conventional, minimum and 
no tillage systems. 
In this study, a MOTAD model is developed and used to analyze the 
optimum enterprise combinations on the Gezira farms. The model is 
presented in the next chapter. 
Selective Applications of Risk Programming Models 
The S chultzian notion that traditional agriculture farms maximize 
profits and therefore use resources efficiently within the limits of 
traditional technology has been subject to criticism. Lipton (1968) 
argued that farmers may choose less risky crops even if they are less 
profitable. According to this interpretation, if we assumed that 
farmers are utility maximizers, allowance must be made for some 
trade-off between variance (as a measure of risk) and expected profit. 
Such allowance cannot be made under the assumption that farmers are 
profit maximizers. Moreover, the variability of production from year 
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to year implies that economic efficiency is equivalent to maximizing 
the expected income over some time period. Consequently, a farmer may 
choose a lower expected income associated with less variability of 
income to ensure a higher probabi 1 i ty of "staying in business". 
Furthermore, Lipton argued that farmers do not maximize profits as 
high profit levels are associated with too much risk. A similar 
cone 1 us ion is reached by Dillon and Anderson ( 1971) which led them to 
state the following hypothesis: 
We would hypothesize that farmers in traditional agriculture 
(and elsewhere) typically have nonlinear utility functions 
(implying active consideration of subjective risk) and 
successfully endeavor to maximize expected utility rather 
than expected profit ••• in our view quantitative information 
on risk attitudes must be an important element in 
understanding farmer behavior in underdeveloped 
agricultures, and ipso facto, in the generation of policies 
for their modernization (p. 31). 
Wiens (1976) used a quadratic programming model to examine the 
impact of yield uncertainity on peasant allocation of land among crops 
and use of hired factor services such as labor and credit. Using 
historical data from China, Wiens demonstrated that the peasants 
decision making behavior exhibited substant:ial risk aversion. His 
final conclusion is that neither risk neutrality nor liquidity 
constraints alone could explain both the cropping patterns and the 
factor employment observed among Chinese farmers. 
In the African continent, the issue of risk is investigated by 
Wolgin (1975) in Kenya. He demonstrated that the traditional tests of 
economic efficiency in peasant agriculture, using marginal analysis, 
are generally misspecified if farmers are making their decisions in 
the presence of risk. Furthermore, Wolgin concluded that risk plays 
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an important role in farmer decision making and that farmers under 
conditions of uncertainity behave as risk averse entrepeneurs. 
Consideration of risk and uncertainity in project appraisal 
studies need more emphasis because it seems that so far no agreed 
procedure or practice has emerged. Several international 
organizations such as the World Bank hav~ apparently decided that the 
informational and analytical costs arising from rather sophisticated 
methods of risk analysis outweigh the benefits to be gained in terms 
of better decisions about uncertain projects (Anderson, 1983). The 
conventional methodology to account for risk and uncertainity in 
project appraisal is sensitivity analysis adopted by Gi'ttinger (1972) 
and Little and Mirrlees (1974). However, sensitivity analysis per 
se is surely inadequate because it is based on subjective judgment 
about possible increments in project costs or otherwise reduction in 
project benefits. 
Hillier (1963) developed a project appraisal model for estimating 
the probabi 1 i ty distribution of present value (PV) by using expected 
value E(PV) and variance V(PV). He relied on the Central Limit 
Theorem for approximately normal distribution of PV. By estimating 
the mean and variance of PV, the decision maker can evaluate the risk 
consequences of a particular investment. This model, however, is 
er it ic i zed for statistical dependencies and potential correlations of 
covariances. 
Stochastic simulation has been the most widely used model for 
eva 1 ua ting uncertainity in project appraisal (Anderson, 1983). Monte 
Carlo sampling technique for estimating the distribution of PV and 
internal rate of return (IRR) was examined by Reutlinger (1970) and 
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applied by Pouliquen (1970). The approach developed and applied by 
Pou 1 i q uen is based on identifying the most critical components of the 
project and simulating the probability of IRR under different 
assumptions underlying the critical components. The World Bank 
approaches so far are confined to Gittinger' s sensitivity analysis and 
Reutlinger's stochastic simulation approaches. 
Finally, there have been attempts to incorporate risk in 
agricultural sector models. Econometric models are frequently 
employed in determining the market-clearing prices using supply and 
demand equations at the sector level. Dulcy and Norton (1975) have 
shown how linear programming models can be adapted to solve production 
and marketing problems. However, a major difficulty in incorporating 
risk behavior in sector supply models is the need to aggregate the 
individual utility functions (Simmons and Pomareda, 1975). The 
difficulty arises .from the fact that the expected utility theorem is 
based on ordinal preference indices rather than cardinal measures. 
These preference indices are only defined up to linear 
transformations, and are not strictly additive over individuals. 
Moreover, quadratic utility functions for income cannot be added to 
draw inferences about the whole sector. To overcome aggregation 
problems economists have developed a weighted average procedure where 
the weights are the risk shares cri/"i.cr .• Several applications of 
1. 
this weighted average procedure is documented in the literature by the 
work of Hazell et al (1981), Simmons and Pomareda (1975), and Kutcher 
and Scandizzo (1981). 
.54 
Implications of Risk Analysis to Gezira 
In Gezira, farmers must decide how much of their limited small 
holdings should be allocated among various cash and food crops. The 
E-V analysis provides an opportunity to select the optimum combination 
of crops that maximi~es the tenant satisfaction and leads to 
improvement in the currently deteriorating economic conditions in the 
Gezira and the country at large. 
Key comp on en ts of such an analysis inc 1 ude identifying the 
relevant sources of risk; collecting the appropriate data such as crop 
yields and prices; and constructing the cost of production series. In 
addition, one must distinguish between known patterns of variation and 
random variation. In this .... study, the basic assumption is that 
producers base their plans on the long-term mean of net returns and 
that any deviation from the mean is a random event. The relevant 
sources of risk are institutional credit, hired labor, and timing and 
frequency of irrigation water. To account for the rationality of the 
peasant farmer, subsistance constraints are included in the 
deterministic model. 
In general, the optimum farm plan is determined by many factors 
such as social and economic status, access to the production factors, 
family composition, education and years of farming experience. 
Unfortunately, no detailed socio-economic survey reports at the Scheme 
level are available about the Gezira, however, a sample survey 
conducted by the author at the Gezira shows a high degree of economic 
and social similarities among Gezira tenants. According to the survey 
results 85 percent of the tenants own equal size tenancies and have 
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equal acccess to production factors and services provided by the 
Gezira management. Eighty percent of the tenants have only pre-school 
education and almost all tenants have extensive experience in farming. 
Ana 1 y tic a 1 i9y, the model shows the area to be specified for each crop 
based on the response of the crop to the availability of scarce 
resources, particularly capital liquidity, hired labor and irrigation 
water. 
Hazell (1982) asserted that optimal crop mixes could be 
determined f,or representative farms using mean-variance models, and 
these would then have wide-spread applications to other farms of the 
same type. Following Hazel's assertion and given the fact that Gezira 
farms are relatively homogenous in nature, this study will utilize a 
mean-variance criteria to compute a set of efficient farm plans that 
would minimize the risk for any given expected income. The underlying 
assumption in this analysis is that the Gezira farmers are risk-averse 
and that ignorance of risk, as it affects Gezira farmers, has 
contributed significantly to the deteriorating economic conditions for 
the Gezira Scheme. 
CHAPTER IV 
SPECIFICATION OF A LINEAR RISK PROGRAMMING 
MODEL FOR THE GEZIRA SCHEME 
The Analytical Framework 
In this study the framework under which the analysis is conducted 
is based on the assumption that farmers bear the risk associated with 
income fluctuations over time. They base their plans on the long term 
mean of net returns and that~any deviation from the mean is a random 
event. The decision on how much area should be devoted to each crop 
will be predicted by the model depending on the resource endowment. 
Other assumptions are that: (a) the tenant will pay a land and water 
charge to the Scheme management in return for services provided; (b) 
the tenant wi 11 repay all the cash and in-kind credit plus interest 
advanced by the Scheme; (c) the management will continue to perform 
and regulate the marketing of cotton and wheat; (d) the tenant may 
u t i 1 i ze his family labor or hired labor at a given wage rate; ( e) the 
tenant can borrow any amount of informal credit at a given interest 
rate to supplement his operating capital needs; and (f) the total area 
cultivated is determined basically by the amount of hired labor, 




Given the above assumptions, the representative tenants may adopt 
the following alternative decision criteria: (a) to allocate 
resources so as to maximize net cash returns to fixed farm resources; 
or (b) to allocate resources to maximize utility by striking some 
balance between increasing expected income and minimizing income 
variability to reflect risk behavior. 
Deterministic linear programming models can be used to derive the 
profit maximizing solution. However, the principal criticism leveled 
against using deterministic models as. planning tools relates to the 
embodied assumption that all coefficients are determined with perfect 
knowledge. Risk programming models, however, recognize the importance 
of risk in agricultural planning and have led to the development of a 
normative decision theory based on inclusion of stochastic elements in 
whole farm planning models. -The analytical framework in this study is 
based on incorporating such stochastic elements to evaluate the 
planning process in the Gezira risky environment. 
Formulation of the Model 
The mode 1 adopted for this analysis is a modified MOTAD approach 
developed to derive a set of efficient farm plans under risky 
conditions for a typical farm in the Gezira Scheme. The basic concept 
is to minimize total absolute deviations about expected income subject 
to linear constraints on level of expected income and other resources. 
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Basic Risk Programming Model 
In matrix notation, the MOTAD model may be formulated as follows: 
Minimize Ld, (4.1) 
Subject to: AX< B (4.2) 
DX+ Id> 0 (4. 3) 
c x = II. (4.4) 
and 
X,d,11. ~ 0 (4.5) 
where 
X = a column vector of activity levels; 
A= a matrix of technical input-output coefficients; 
B = a column vector of avatlable resources; 
C = a row vector of expected gross margins; 
D = a deviation matrix representing the difference between actual 
and expected gross margins in a particular year; 
d = a vector representing the total negative deviations su11DI1ed 
over all risky enterprises; 
L = a row vector of ones; 
I= an identify matrix of the number of years in the study 
period; 
11. a scalar used to parametrize the expected total gross margin 
constraint level. The maximum value of A is the maximum 
value of the basic L.P. solution. 
There are two steps in the computational procedure of this model. 
First, a convent ion a 1 1 inear programming maximization problem is 
formulated and solved to determine the maximum value of 11. which is the 
maximum expected total gross margin or highest attainable point on the 
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risk efficiency frontier. Second, the elements of risk are introduced 
through minimization of total negative deviations represented by the 
objective function, Ld. Other points on the risk efficiency frontier 
are obtained by decreasing the objective function value (~) 
parametrically in arbitrary decrements. Along the efficiency 
frontier, the MOTAD model minimizes total negative deviation (TND) for 
any given expected total gross margin. This TND value is transformed 
into an estimate of standard deviation by multiplication of a 
constant, K. The K value was calculated by Herry (1965), and applied 
by Hazell (1971), Simmons and Pomareda (1975), Brink and Mccarl (1978) 
and Mapp et al. (1979) as: 
K = 2~ i ~ 2(s-1) (4.6) 
where 
s = number of years in the series; and 
IT= a mathematical constant equaling 3.14286. 
The standard deviation (S.D.) can therefore be expressed as: 
S.D. = KLd (4. 7) 
This transformation allows the model to determine a set of 
efficient farm plans along an E-cr or E-V efficiency frontier. 
Depending on a farmer's attitude toward risk, he can select the farm 
plan that will maximize his utility. 
Assumptions of the Model 
Since MOTAD basically is a linear relationship, all the 
assumptions of the conventional linear programming model hold except 
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the assumption which states that resource supplies, input-output 
coefficients, prices of resources and activities are known with 
certainty. The assumptions for MOTAD are: (a) additivity of 
resources and activities; (b) linearity of the objective function; (c) 
non-negativity of the decision variables; (d) divisibility of 
act i vi ties and resource; (e) finiteness of activities and resource 
restrictions; and (f) proportionality of activity levels ~d 
resources. 
Other assumptions associated with whole-farm planning models 
using MOTAD are: (1) net returns or gross margins are considered to 
have a normal distribution; (2) the decision maker's preference among 
alternative farm plans is expressed in terms of expected income E and 
associated variance V, therefore, his preference or utility function 
may be described as quadratic: 
U = f(E,V) (4.8) 
and (3) the indifference curves resulting from the above utility 
function are convex with positive slopes. This latter characteristic 
implies that decision makers are risk averse. 
Limitations of the Model 
Despite MOTAD' s wide acceptability as a suitable technique for 
evaluating whole-farm planning models under risk, the model has 
limitations. Accurate and reliable time series data .on gross margins 
for the enterprise activities are essential to evaluate risk 
associated with different plans, yet difficult to secure. 
MOTAD measures risk as total negative deviation from expectation. 
This measure, however, is arbitrary and raises questions about how 
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farmers perceive risk and wh~t measure of risk is appropriate in such 
types of farm planning (Brink and Mccarl, 1978). In this analysis the 
mean of the series of gross margins is used as a measure of 
expectations because of the relatively short series available (13 
years). In relatively long series data models, the mean appears to be 
an unreliable measure of the decision makers expectations. Young 
( 19 80) argued that weighted moving average models are theoretically 
and empirically better for evaluating risk based on long series 
historical data. However, the choice of appropriate weights for 
computing moving average is still an empirical .limitation. 
Data Requirements 
Computation of the MOTAD model requires time series data on gross 
margins (net returns) for each enterprise in the model. The deviation 
matrix is obtained by subtracting the expected value or average gross 
margin from the gross margin value for each year in the series. It is 
this deviation matrix which forms the basic objective function of the 
model. 
Input-output coefficients and resource availability must be 
specified. The resource constraints specified for the Gezira model 
include land, family labor, hired labor, irrigation water and 
institutional credit. The real activities are limited to the main 
crops grown in the Gezira Scheme and include cotton, wheat, groundnut 
and sorghum. The initial MOTAD tableau is presented in Appendix C. 
• 
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Sources of Data 
The data for this study were obtained from different sources. 
Primary data were obtained by conducting a field survey of 50 Gezira 
tenants during January-February, 1984. Official Gezira managers and 
field staff were also interviewed, as well as Agricultural Research 
Corporation specialists. Secondary data were obtained from the Sudan 
Gezira Board archives and records as well as the Department of Rural 
Economic studies at the Faculty of Agriculture, Khartoum University. 
Addition a 1 information was available from other sources including the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resource, Ministry of Planning, 
Ministry of Irrigation, the Agricultural Bank of the Sudan, Cotton 
Public Corporation and the Bank of the Sudan. Furthermore, the data 
were supplemented by official records of agricultural personnel 
working at the Gezira Scheme Block level. 
The Sample Survey 
Organizationally, the Main Gezira Scheme is divided into three 
divisions: Northern, Central and Southern. Each division is 
subdivided into groups and blocks. Two blocks were selected randomly 
from the Central and Northern divisions. Twenty-five tenants were 
interviewed from each block. The questionnaire included information 
about various soc i a-economic characteristics of the tenants, family 
and hi red labor availability, machinery and equipment, credit sources 
and irrigation water timing and frequency. 
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The sample of the farmers interviewed was selected randomly with 
the help of the Block Inspector (B.I.). The B.I. is an administrative 
officer representing the Sudan Gezira Board. To facilitate 
communication the purpose of the survey was first explained to the 
B.I. who in turn introduced the interviewer to the tenants. After the 
first round, tenant's answers were checked for consistency by 
comparing. responses and revisiting them to obtain explanation for any 
inconsistency. 
The socio-economic characteristics of the tenants interviewed are 
shown in Table IV. On the average, tenants in the sample survey were 
54 years of age, completed pre-school education in Khalwa (religious 
school), operated the farm most of their lives and cropped an average 
area of 15 feddans. All tenancies in the survey were owner operated. 
The average household size was six members. Four out of the six 
members were adults while two were dependent children. The household 
composition is important both as a source of labor and as a 
consumption unit. Field observation indicates that women, especially 
wives, were active participants in the agricultural production. In 
the Gezira Scheme widows were allowed to operate a tenancy even if 
there were no adult sons. 
Adequate supply of household labor is very critical especially 
during peak periods such as weeding and harvesting. The age at which 
family members are considered economically active in this study is 15 
to 65 years. Family labor supplied on a regular basis was estimated 
from the survey at 240 manhours per month. Hired labor availability 
was estimated by respondents during the survey in terms of man days 
per month. The man days available were converted to equivalent 
TABLE IV 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE TENANTS 
INTERVIEWED IN THE GEZIRA SCHEME, 1984. 
Characteristics Mean 
Age (yrs). 54 
Educational achievement (yrs). 2.4 
Years associated with operating 
the farm 34 
Area cropped ( feddans) 15 
Average household size (persons) 6 
Hours of family labor available 











manhours by assuming a working day of seven hours. The monthly 
available hired labor derived from the survey results is presented in 
Table v. More hired labor is usually recruited from outside the 
project region during peak harvesting periods (December-April). 
Eighty-three percent of the tenants interviewed considered 
themselves as full-time farmers while the remaining 17 percent were 
part-time farmers. This implies that the majority of the farmers in 
the Gezira derived their incomes from the farm. Almost all the 
respondents adopted the rotation set by the Gezira management which 
included five feddans of cotton, five feddans of wheat, and five 
feddans of ground.nut, sorghum and vegetables. Only five percent of 
the respondents incorporated vegetables in the rotation. 
Eighty percent of the respondents expressed preference to devote 
more feddans to sorghum. Among the reasons cited by the tenants for 
sorghum preference are: (a) to satisfy family consumption needs; (b) 
simple cultural operations; (c) tenants are familiar with growing 
sorghum since it is a traditional crop of the Gezira area even before 
the irrigation system; (d) easy marketing to local merchants; and 
( e) it represents a risk management strategy against unforseen future 
hazards. 
·Most of the respondents reported the possession of an average of 
four goats or sheep to provide daily milk consumption. None, however, 
reported the possession of any mechanical equipment. Almost all 
tenants interviewed expressed a willingness to utilize higher 
mechanical power especially during land preparation and weeding 
seasons. They all raised the issue that the tractor fleet owned by 
the Gezira management is not adequate to perform timely land 
TABLE V 
MONTHLY HIRED LABOR AVAILABILITY FROM SAMPLE OF TENANTS 
INTERVIEWED IN THE GEZIRA SCHEME, 1982/83. 
Month Man-hours Equivalent 
June 140.0 













preparation operations. Private machinery contractors are available 
but demand very high prices. Fifty-eight percent of the respondents 
reported problems due to timing and frequency of irrigation. 
Information concerning the institutional credit was obtained from 
the records of the Block Inspector since all institutional credit is 
provided to the tenants on equal basis and is channeled through that 
office of the Block Inspector. The institutional credit is provided 
both in-kind (materials, mechanical services and marketing s-ervices) 
and in cash. In season 1982-83, each tenant received in-kind and cash 
advances for cotton and wheat equalling Ls. 197.484 and Ls. 116.029 
per feddan, respectively. 
Secondary Data 
The basic source of secondary data is the annual economic reports 
submitted by the Economic and Social Research Unit (ESRU) of the Sudan 
Gezira Board. The ESRU conducts an annual economic survey based on 
observations and continuous follow-up of cultivation practices from 
land preparation to harvesting at different locations throughout the 
Scheme. Historical crop yields per feddan presented in Table VI were 
derived from ERSU data. These yields were multiplied by season prices 
to obtain the gross returns. 
The net returns or gross margins are the annual gross returns 
minus the total variable cost of production for any particular 
enterprise in any particular year. Time series data on total variable 
costs and gross returns were derived from ERSU survey data and are 
presented in Tables VII and VIII, respectively. The high variability 

















HISTORICAL CROP YIELDS PER FEDDAN FOR THE 
GEZIRA SCHEME, 1971-83 
• 
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Cotton Wheat Groundnut Sorghum 
a 
-- - - - - - - - - --------------tons I feds.----------------------
o. 782 0.387 0.413 0.507 
o. 713 0.512 0.501 0.436 
0.583 0.668 1.250 1.000 
o. 723 0.800 1.250 o. 750 
0.657 0.386 1.500 0.623 
0.388 .. .P· 388 0.767 0.655 
0.523 0.580 1.200 0.354 
0.613 0.471 1.075 0.427 
0.467 0.251 0.872 0.500 
0.380 0.476 1.200 o. 250 
0.329 0.500 0.605 0.400 
0.555 0.400 1.200 0.500 
0.671 0.694 1.200 0.523 
Various issues of the Gezira Current Statistics, Economic 
and Social Research Unit, the Sudan Gezira Board, Barakat. 

















ESTIMATED COST OF PRODUCTION BY CROP BY YEAR 
FOR THE GEZIRA SCHEME, 1971-83 
Cotton Wheat Groundnut Sorghum 
a --------------------Ls. /fed--n--------------
32. 553 10.872 14. 239 11. 721 
33.913 12. 641 15.221 12.560 
37. 758 12.970 13.860 11. 331 
39. 820 14.441 14.210 9.420 
51.572 18.682 18. 341 13.421 
72.141 15.431 20. 540 12.222 
74 .964 27.520 22. 711 12 .431 
82.264 29. 371 24.322 13.810 
95. 735 44.842 26.010 15.241 
111. 715 51. 010 38.451 19 .801 
14 7. 991 84. 255 46.910 24.400 
212 .665 67.160 41.480 41.480 
300. 755 124.288 90.415 60.575 
Ls.= Sudanese pound 
Source: Various issues of the Gezira Current Statistics, Economic 



















GROSS RETURNS PER FEDDAN BY CROP BY YEAR 
FOR THE GEZIRA SCHEME, 1971-83 
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Cotton Wheat Groundnut Sorghum 
a 
-----------------------Ls. /fed.----------------------
74.458 14.110 10. 651 13. 761 
66.265 19. 210 14. 321 9.800 
82. 313 20 .100 66. 211 29. 321 
84.124 37.900 69. 512 43.412 
82.081 25.431 88.610 71. 516 
86. 692 25. 213 48. 710 31.700 
128. 340 44. 723 52.610 32.601 
173.294 49 .152 87.430 30. 211 
155.670 41. 260 52. 511 29. 312 
161. 214 65. 380 90.233 52.516 
164. 362 81.659 139. 561 50.899 
329. 970 93 .141 71. 211 71.500 
401. 760 194.100 159. 440 109. 540 
= Sudanese pound. 
Various issues of the Gezira Current Statistics, Economic and 
Social Research Unit, the Sudan Gezira Board, Barakat. 
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increases in input prices and the two major devaluations of the 
Sudanese pound which took place in 1979 and 1981. The gross margin 
series were deflated using GDP deflator to reflect 1982 constant 
prices. The deflated time series gross margins are shown in Table IX. 
Secondary data on irrigation. water supplied to the Gezira Scheme 
on daily basis were obtained from Agricultural Research Corporation 
studies. The current water supply and deficit were estimated by Faki 
(19 82) and are shown in Tab le X. According to Fakki study, the 
June/September deficit could have been met by rainfall which was 
estimated by t.he Gezira Meteorological Station records at an average 
3 
of 6.755 mil. m per day. Therefore, the major water constraint 
occurs during the October/November period when most crops compete for 
irrigation water. For this re~on a water constraint was specified in 
the model for the October/November period only. In general, the field 
irrigation canals layout in the Gezira specified an area of 15 feddans 
to be irrigated by each field canal. Water requirements per feddan 
for each crop and availability at field canal level is presented in 
Appendix B and summarized for October-November peak in Table XI. The 
water availability at field canal level per day is assumed by the 
irrigation specialists in the Gezira Scheme to represent the current 
supply conditions for a field of an average size of 15 feddans. 
The final set of data derived from ERSU are the monthly labor 
requirements by crop for both family and hired labor. The estimated 
labor requirements by crop activity per feddan for family and hired 
labor are presented in Tables XII and XIII, respectively. A general 
feature in the Gezira Scheme is low contribution of family labor to 
Year 
TABLE IX 
ESTIMATED GROSS MARGINS BY CROP BY YEAR 
FOR THE GEZIRA SCHEME IN $982 
CONSTANT PRICES, 1971-83 





1971 182.196 21.578 -19.191 - 6.609 
1972 129.404 31. 380 - 4.856 -13.640 
1973 165.019" 31.664 198. 685 70.037 
1974 .152. 772 26.693 191. 641 116.552 
1975 89. 732 22. 768 206. 265 172.679 
19'76 37. 310 2'6.974 72.874 49. 356 
1977 124.130 40.279 70. 302 47. 295 
1978 189. 646 42.604 131. 500 36.817 
1979 115. 260 -2.367 50.869 27. 790 
1980 76. 152 21.538 80. 355 51.125 
1981 19. 724 -4.163 111.216 31.927 
1982 117. 305 25.981 29. 731 30.020 
1983 77. 696 53.954 52. 697 37.664 
Mean 104. 680" 26.081 90.183 50.078 
Standard 
Deviation 74. 358 36.044 51.188 48. 896 
a 
Ls. = Sudanese pound. 
bThe capital and labor cost are not included. 
Particulars 
TABLE X 
WATER BALANCE IN THE GEZIRA SCHEME 
BY PERIODS 
June/Sept Oct/Nov Dec/March 
---------------mil.m3/day------------
Canal capacity 31.000 31.000 31.000 
Max. Transit losses 3.200 2.100 2.000 
Requirements for other uses 3.868 1.873 1.170 
Max. requirements for main 
crops 30.668 35.09 27.750 
Balance -6.736 -8.063 0.080 








ESTIMATED MEAN WATER REQUIREMENTS PER FEDDAN PER DAY AND 
AVAILABILITY AT FIELD CANAL LEVEL PER DAY IN THE 







Mean Requirements Per Feddan Per Day 







28.50 29 .oo 25.00 605 .09 
30. 30 25.00 24.50 17 .80 605. 09 
30. 30 25.00 21.50 605.09 
30.30 16. 90 . 18.00 481.95 
30.00 21. 80 15.00 481.95 
28.50 26.90 481.95 
Source: Appendix B. 

















MONTHLY FAMILY LAVOR USE BY CROP 





0.67 6.64 3.54 
0.52 4.92 6.51 
5.82 5.87 
9.90 2.46 3.50 
11. 52 0.48 0.30 0.30 
5.46 7.54 0.20 15.43 
2.94 7.50 4.18 5.61 





Source: ESRU survey, 1982/83. 
Month 
TABLE XIII 
MONTHLY HIRED LABOR REQUIREMENTS BY CROP 
FOR THE GEZIRA SCHEME 




June 33.51 4. 71 
July 1.01 32.10 21. 65 
Aug 13.21 13.14 17.42 
Sept 16. 32 6.90 1.38 
Oct 18.42 0.44 1.08 0.68 
Nov 1.53 2.13 10. 72 22 .05 
Dec 1.15 2.93 36.58 40.96 
Jan 11.95 2.28 13.48 2.00 
Feb 75.10 1. 76 
March 79.46 0.68 
April 30 .13 1.94 
May 
Source: ESRU survey, 1982/83. 
77 
agricultural production. Adult sons of tenants usually preferred 
off-farm work in urban areas. Ahmed (1977) cited two reasons for the 
low family labor contribution to agricultural production in the 
Gezira: ( 1) low returns to farm labor, and (2) spread of diseases 
such as Malaria and Beharzia in the Scheme area. 
Enterprise Budgets 
An enterprise budget is a statement of the physical inputs and 
cos ts necessary to produce a particular crop. Enterprise budgets are 
presented in Appendix A and were derived from a detailed economic 
survey conducted by the Economic and Social Research Unit of the Sudan 
Gezira Board in 1982-83 season. The survey results are based on 
field observations and with continuous follow-up throughout the season 
for a random sample of 140 tenants at different locations in the 
Scheme. A major drawback of the survey results, however, is that the 
information provided is presented as stock rather than flow estimates, 
i.e. the production items are expressed in total value without a 
breakdown of physical quantity and price per unit. Hence the author's 
sample survey was used to supplement the Gezira survey results in 
deriving model parameters, particularly labor and credit coefficients. 
The enterprise budgets were used to derive operating capital financed 
by both institutional and informal credit sources. 
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Components of the Model 
Basic Activities 
In the Gezira Scheme the traditional crops included in the 
current rotation are cotton, sorghum, wheat, groundnut and vegetables 
and account for 43 percent, 28 percent, 14 percent, 12 percent and 3 
percent of the crop area, respectively. The rotation system in the 
Scheme permits production of only one crop from the same land every 
season. Due to the lack of time series data about vegetables they 
have been excluded in the analysis. However, this exclusion is 
assumed to have a minimum effect on a tenant's decision criteria 
because vegetables are grown by only five percent of the tenants. In 
addition, vegetables are labor-intensive crops and tenants usually 
rely on sharecroppers to raise vegetables. According to sharecropping 
terms the tenant provides the land and irrigation water while the 
partner provides the labor and credit. Livestock activities were 
excluded also because they are not an integrated part of the Scheme 
rotation and no time series data about their costs and returns are 
available. 
The time series data available from the Gezira records extends 
over 13 years (1971-83). In this analysis aggregate time series data 
were used because individual farm data were not available. This 
aggregation, however, may give a downward bias to variance estimation 
because the aggregation process "averages out" part of the variability 
(Eisgruber and Schuman, 1963). 
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Resource Restrictions 
In mathematical programming models production coefficients are 
normally stated in terms of the amounts of inputs required per unit of 
activity. In this study the in formation obtained from the survey 
results and secondary data sources discussed earlier were used to 
estimate the amount of each of the scarce resources needed per unit of 
crop activity defined as one feddan (1 feddan = 1.038 acres). The 
representative farms had an area of 15 feddans each. The land is 
nearly homogenous and reported yields in ·Table VI are appropriate for 
different soil types throughout the study area. Technology 
constraints are not considered because there were no reliable and 
accurate data about the inJfut-output coefficients. Generally, all 
cultivation operations are lll8nual except land preparation. A tractor 
fleet owned by the Sudan Gezira Board performs part of the land 
preparation. However, private contractors contribute the largest 
share in mechanical operations of the Scheme. None of the tenants 
interviewed reported possession of mechanical equipment, however, most 
of the tenants stated that they usually contracted for land plowing. 
The cost of plowing was considered as an operating cost. 
For the Gezira Scheme, the major binding resource constraints are 
institutional· credit, hired labor and irrigation water. Hired labor 
and irrigation water are critical during peak periods such as planting 
and harvesting. The year was divided into 12 months during which 
crops may be planted or harvested and the amounts of family labor, 
hired labor, water and credit available to the program in each month 
were specified. The average wage rate for hired labor was Ls. 
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0. 5 /hour. For both groundnut and sorghum no institutional credit was 
available and the tenant must depend on the informal credit sources. 
The informal credit from local money-lenders and merchants is assumed 
available and can be borrowed at 50 percent interest rate. The 
institutional credit available was estimated by Gezira management at 
Ls. 1500 per average tenancy size of 15 feddans. This credit can be 
borrowed at ten percent interest rate. 
CHAPfER V 
ANALYSIS OF RISK EFFICIENT FARM PLANS 
This chapter presents and discusses a set of risk efficient farm 
plans derived from the analysis of the representative farms in the 
Gezira Scheme. The farm plan that maximizes expected income was 
d~termined by a linear programm.ifig model. The results of this basic 
linear programming model are given first. The model is then extended 
to incorporate risk parameters measured as deviations from an expected 
gross margin for each enterprise. The linear program maximum income 
solution is the highest attainable point on the risk efficiency 
frontier. Other points on the risk efficiency frontier are determined 
by decreasing the objective function parametrically in arbitrary 
decrements of Ls. 50 expected income. The sensitivity of the optimum 
plan to changes in the hired labor constraint, the institutional 
credit constraint, and a parallel increase in both hired labor and 
institutional credit is analyzed assuming a given potential increase 
in the availability of the two resources. The results of the 
sensitivity of the optimum plan to any increase in irrigation water 
quantity will not be presented because the model results have shown 
that water quantity is not a limiting constraint in all the computed 
solutions. Finally, the sensitivity of the optimum plan to a change 
81 
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in crop gross margins is examined assuming the government paid 
producers prices equivalent to world prices rather than the government 
market price. 
Basic Model Results 
Risk Measurement Statistics 
The risk measurement statistics used in the analysis of this 
chapter are total negative deviation (TND), standard deviation (SD), 
and coeffi.cient of variation (CV). For every expected income 
specified along the efficiency frontier, the MOTAD model solves for 
the minimum TND that satisfies all the model constraints. This TND is 
then trans formed into an estimate of standard deviation by multipling 
by the constant K as dis cussed in Chapter III. Standard deviation 
measures the dispersion in expected income. Higher incomes are 
usually associated with higher dispersion or variability as measured 
by standard deviation or variance. The coefficient of variation 
statistic provides a measure of relative variability expressed as a 
percentage and calculated by dividing standard deviation by expected 
income • The fa rm decision maker may select any plan along the risk 
efficiency frontier depending on his relative perception of risk and 
his resource endowment. 
Profit Maximization Plan 
Farm plan 1 presented in Table XIV represents the profit 
maximization solution derived from the basic linear programming model. 
Farm 
Plans Unit Plan la 
Expected Inco•e Ls. 848. 298 
Total Negative 
Deviation Ls. 2841. 000 
Standard 
Deviation Ls. 570.076 
Coefficient of 
Variation % 67.23 
Total Area 
Cultivated Fed 13.4 
Cotton Fed 5.3 
Wheat Fed 4.6 
Groundnut Fed J.5 
Sorghum Fed 
Hired Labor Use H.H. 1959.4 
Institutional 
Credit Use Ls. 1500.00 
Informal (Sheil) 
Credit Use Ls. 853.094 
Irrigation Water M3 1848. 7 
(Oct-Nov Peak 
only) 
8 This Plan represents the linear 
TABLE XIV 
SUMMARY SET OF EFFICIENT FARM PLANS DERIVED FROM 
THE GEZIRA BASIC MOTAD MODEL - MODEL 1 
Plan 2 Plan 3 Plan 4 Plan 5 Plan 6 Plan 7 
798.000 748.000 698.000 648.000 598. 000 %8.000 
2327.000 2091.000 1804. 000 1727.000 1566.000 1387.000 
498.271 437.288 382.191 346. 562 314. 344 278.413 
62.44 58.45 54. 75 53.49 52.56 50.80 
12.1 ll .2 10.8 9.4 8.2 6.6 
4.6 4.2 4.0 3.3 2.9 2.4 
2.5 2.2 2.0 1. 2 0.5 
3.6 3.6 J.7 4.0 4.2 3.7 
1.4 1. 2 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.5 
1786.5 1684. 5 1615.9 1443.2 1298.6 lll8.7 
ll89.926 1084.406 1003.038 800.277 627. 800 526. 896 
766. 992 685.664 601.187 528.045 422.174 309 .506 
1516.8 1429. 5 1361.1 ll89, 3 1023.2 877 .5 
programming profit maximization solution. 
Plan 8 Plan 9 Plan 10 
498.000 448.000 398.000 
1087.000 927 .000 828.000 
228.134 195.059 166.205 
45.81 43.54 41.45 
5.7 4.5 3.5 
2.1 1.6 1.4 
3.1 2.5 1.9 
0.4 0.3 0.2 
931.2 743. 5 555.8 
438.579 350.262 261. 945 
196.838 168.338 130.500 
727. 3 581.0 434.3 
00 
(.;.) 
This plan is likely to be selected by risk-neutral decision makers. 
The maximum expected income attainable, given the existing resource 
situation in the Gezira, is Ls. 848.298. The profit maximization is 
also associated with the maximum variability measured by TND at Ls. 
2841.000, standard deviation of Ls. 570.076 and coefficient of 
variation equalling 67.23 percent. This plan utilizes 13.4 feddans of 
land consisting of 5.3 feddans of cotton, 4.6 feddans of wheat and 3.5 
feddans of groundnut. Sorghum does not enter this profit maximization 
plan. 
On the resource side, the profit maximization plan utilizes 
1959 .4 manhours of hired labor per year, the maximum amount of 
institutional credit specified in the model of Ls. 1500, and 1848. 7 
3 f''' d' h b b k m o 1rr1.gat1.on water ur1.ng t e Octo er-Novem er pea • The only 
limiting constraints in this solution are labor and institutional 
credit. When labor is specified on a monthly basis, the model 
predicts labor scarcity during June, July and March. This implies a 
seasonal labor-shortage problem in the Gezira Scheme. Irrigation 
water is not a limiting constraint even during the October-November 
peak. 
The profit maximization plan is similar to the current rotation 
in the Gezira Scheme which is enforced by the project management--
more feddans of cotton and wheat are specified relative to groundnut 
and sorghum. However, while this rotation provides the highest 
expected income, it is also associated with a corresponding higher 
risk and income variability as measured by the standard deviation and 
coefficient of variation. The dominating position of cotton in the 
model solution is a direct consequence of its high expected gross 
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margin but it is limited at the margin by labor and institutional 
credit constraints. Wheat comes into the solution basically because 
of its low labor requirements but it is also restricted at the margin 
by institutional credit. Sorghum does not enter the plan because of 
relatively low gross margin and labor scarcity during the planting 
season. 
Hired labor utilization for the profit maximization plan during 
the 12 month period is outlined in Table XV. All available hired 
labor is used by the plan during June, July and March, while varying 
amounts of hired labor are left unused during the other seven months. 
The shadow price column denotes the marginal value product or 
reduction in expected income associated with reducing the amount of 
hired labor available to the plan by one manhour. When hired labor is 
not fully utilized it has a zero shadow price. 
The irrigation water utilization during the October-November peak 
is presented in Table XVI. The total amount of water utilized by the 
plan in any single period falls below the irrigation water limitation 
imposed on the mode 1. Thus the constraint placed on the amount of 
irrigation water available to the plan does not seem to be limiting 
under the assumed supply condition presented in Chapter IV. Hence, 
additional cropping area could be brought into cultivation at the 
Scheme level to utilize the surplus water. 
Risk Efficient Farm Plans 
As expected income is parameterized from Ls. 848.298 to Ls. 















MONTHLY HIRED LABOR USE BY THE PROFIT MAXIMIZATION 
PLAN FOR A REPRESENTATIVE FARM 






124. 3 15.7 
114.5 25. 5 
103. 0 107.0 
61.3 148. 7 






















IRRIGATION WATER USE BY THE PROFIT MAXIMIZATION 
PRODUCTION PLAN FOR A REPRESENTATIVE FARM 




















farms plans is generated with results presented as plans 2 to 10 in 
Table XIV. The plans are furnished to provide the decision maker with 
a wide choice for enterprise combination and resource allocation. The 
decision maker has to judge the suitability of any plan as determined 
by the trade-off between expected income and the standard deviation or 
variance of income. 
When the expected income is decreased from Ls 848.298 to Ls. 
798.000, the total area cultivated is reduced to 12.1 feddans. Cotton 
and wheat area reduces to 4.6 feddans and 2.5 feddans, respectively, 
while groundnut increases slightly to 3.6 feddans. Sorghum comes into 
the solution at a level of 1.4 feddans. By reducing the area of 
cotton and wheat the standard deviation is reduced by Ls. 71.805 and 
the coefficient of variation by 4. 79 percent. This implies that high 
variability is associated with cotton and wheat production and, as 
risk in terms of variability is reduced, cotton and wheat enterprises 
are reduced. The less risky enterprises of groundnut and sorghum are 
increased. A decision maker who selects plan 2 must purchase 1786.5 
manhours of hired labor, Ls. 1189.926 of institutional credit and have 
1848.7 m3 of irrigation water at his disposal during 
October-November peak. 
For Plan 3, expected income is further reduced from Ls. 798.000 
to Ls. 748. 000. The standard deviation and coefficient of variation 
are reduced by Ls. 60.983 and 3.99 percent, respectively. The 
cropping pattern consists of 4.2 feddans of cotton, 2.2 feddans of 
wheat, 3.6 feddans of groundnut and 1.2 feddans of sorghum. Hired 
labor requirements are further reduced to 1684.5 manhours, 
institutional capital to Ls. 1084.406 and irrigation water needs to 
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3 d • b b 1429.5 m uring Octo er-Novem er peak. Through the rest of the 
plans between Ls. 798.000 and Ls. 398.000, the production pattern 
shows a steady relative decline in the areas of cotton and sorghum. 
Wheat production is discontinued at income levels below Ls. 598.000, 
while groundnut shows a steady increase up to Plan 6 then reduces 
steadily. Subsequent de~lines in standard deviation, coefficient of 
variation and resource use is associated with lower expected incomes. 
The risk efficiency frontier shown in Figure 7 represents the 
alternative risk efficient farm plans outlined in Table XIV. The 
frontier may also be denoted as the E-V curve where E represents the 
expected income and V the variance of income. Moving to the right 
along the efficiency frontier, greater risk has to be assumed by the 
dee is ion maker to obtain a given increase in expected income. Moving 
to the left of the E-V frontier is associated with less risk and lower 
expected incomes. The trade-off between income and risk is best 
represented by the coefficient of variation. Plans associated with 
income levels below Ls. 398.000 are excluded from the analysis because 
the coefficient of variation shows an upward increase implying that a 
rational decision maker may consider the elimination of these farm 
plans if he is really concerned with his income relative to income 
variability measure. 
As indicated by the above analysis, production and sale of cotton 
and wheat in the Gezira Scheme is associated with high income but also 
more risk. If risk has to be reduced both cotton and wheat area 
should be reduced and substituted by the less risky crops which are 
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The sensitivity of the basic model discussed in the previous 
section was tested to estimate the effect of increasing the hired 
labor constraint, the institutional credit constraint, a parallel 
increase in both hired labor and institutional credit, and a change in 
crop prices caused by paying producers a price equivalent to the world 
market price rather than the government market price. This was done 
by increasing hired labor supplied during June to September by 35 
manhours, January to April labor by 105 manhours, and institutional 
credit by Ls. 150. The underlying assumptions for the potential 
increase in hired labor and institutional credit availability is 
discussed below. 
According to Gezira economic reports, the hired labor 
availability at the project and farm levels has been declining during 
the last 13 years and prospects for future increases are not promising 
because of other newly established irrigation projects. During the 
survey period, most of the tenants interviewed mentioned that hired 
labor is available on regular basis for only 20 days each month. 
However, if we assumed the hired labor will work 25 days a month 
instead of 20 days then the available labor manhours will increase by 
the figures stated above. On the other hand, the potential increase 
in the institutional credit from Ls. 1500 to Ls. 1650 per tenancy may 
be possible through the Rehabilitation Project of the Gezira Scheme 
which is assumed to start in the 1984-85 season. An amount of U.S. 
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$36.8 million has been allotted to the Gezira Scheme for the 
procurement of equipment, spare parts and credit as discussed in 
Chapter II. 
Comparison of the basic plan with the new solu.tions provided by 
the sensitivity analysis are presented and discussed. To facilitate 
the comparison procedure, the basic MOTAD model with results 
presented in Table XIV will be referred to as 'Model l', the effect of 
an increase in hired labor as 'Model 2', the effect of an increase in 
institutional credit as 'Model 3', the effect of an increase in both 
hired labor and institutional credit as 'Model 4', and the effect of a 
change in crop prices as 'Model 5'. 
Effect of Increasing Hired Labor 
The response to a potential increase in hired labor is traced in 
Tab 1 e XVI I. As shown in the table, expected income in the profit 
maximization plan (plan 1) has increased to a higher level of Ls. 
956.343 compared to an expected income of Ls. 848.298 in the 
corresponding plan of Model 1. -The cropping mix shows the area of 
cotton is increasing from 5.3 feddans to 6.5 feddans while wheat area 
reduces to 3.9 feddans. One possible explanation is that since cotton 
is more 1 a bor-in tensive than the other crops, by increasing the labor 
constraint more cotton area comes into production and consequently 
more risk. On the resource side, the hired labor use increased by 22 
percent implying that any attempt to increase cotton area in the 
Gezira Scheme should be associated with a corresponding increase in 
Farm 
Plans Unit 













Hired Labor Use M.H. 
Institutional 
Credit Use Ls. 
Irrigation Water M3 
(Oct-Nov Peak 
only) 
aThis Plan represents 
TABLE XVII 
SUMMARY SET OF EFFICIENT FARM PLANS ASSUMING A POTENTIAL 
INCREASE IN HIRED LABOR - MODEL 2 
Plan 1 a Plan 2 Plan 3 Plan 4 Plan 5 Plan 6 Plan 7 Plan 8 
956. 343 906.000 856.000 806.000 756.000 706.000 656.000 606.000 
3239 .ooo 2715.000 2480.000 2301.000 2045.000 1716.000 1586.000 1485.000 
650 .166 576. 759 515.825 461.881 410.494 368.461 332.477 298.085 
67.98 63.66 60.26 57. 30 54.29 52 .19 50. 53 48.18 
,I 
13.9 13.4 13.4 12.8 11. 7 10.1 9.1 7.9 
6.5 5.4 5.1 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.02 
3.9 2.9 2.6 2.3 1.6 0.9 0.5 0.4 
3.5 3.6 4.5 4.7 5.2 5.1 5.0 4.3 
1.5 1.2 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2 
2385.5 2176.9 2073. 7 2005. 8 1833.1 1677.8 1523.4 "1336.l 
1500.000 1429.267 1319.613 1237.239 1031.142 858.820 717. 741 629.424 
1996.6 1847.7 1654.9 1687.4 1514. 9 1349. 2 ll90.4 1043 .8 
the linear programming profit maximization solution. 
Plan 9 Plan 10 
556.000 506.000 







O. l O. l 
ll48.5 961. l 
541.107 452. 789 
897. 59 750.9 
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hired labor availability. The irrigation water consumption, however, 
shows only a slight increase of eight percent. 
The remaining set of efficient farm plans in Table XVII traces 
out the effects of parameterizing expected income from Ls. 956.343 to 
Ls. 506.000 in decrements of Ls. 50. In plan 2 the area of cotton and 
wheat reduces, while sorghum comes into the solution at a level of 1.5 
feddans. The standard deviation is reduced by Ls. 105.183 and the 
coefficient of variation is reduced from 67.98 percent to 63.66 
percent. This again implies that as cotton area is reduced, income 
variability or risk is also reduced. Between expected incomes of Ls. 
906.000 and Ls. 506.000, the area of production, the standard 
deviation, and the coefficient of variation are reduced steadily. 
However, groundnut shows an increasing trend up to plan 5 then 
decreases steadily. 
The risk efficiency frontier obtained from Model 2 is traced in 
Figure 8. This frontier is higher than the one derived from Model 1. 
Thus we may conclude that the provision of additional hired labor in 
the Gezira Scheme, especially during peak periods, will both increase 
expected income and reduce risk for given levels of income. For 
example, at expected income level of Ls. 800, Model 2 is associated 
with less risk as compared to Model 1 at the same income level. 
Effect of Increasing Institutional Credit 
As the institutional credit constraint is increased from Ls. 1500 
to Ls. 1650, the maximum expected income increases slightly from Ls. 
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XVIII. The increase in expected income is two percent. The standard 
deviation also increases by an equivalent amount, thus the relative 
var i ab i 1 it y measure remains the same. Cot ton area remains the same 
wb.ile wheat area increases from 4.6 feddans to 5.3 feddans. This may 
be explained by the fact that cotton is restricted at the margin by 
the March picking labor constraint. 
When the expected income in Table XVIII is parameterized from Ls. 
868.444 to Ls. 818.000, the area of both cotton and wheat is reduced 
from 5. 3 feddans to 4. 8 feddans and 2. 7 feddans, respectively. 
Groundnut area remains at 3.2 feddans while sorghum comes into the 
solution at 1. 5 feddans. Standard deviation and coefficient of 
variation decrease by Ls. 72.388 and 4.69 percent, respectively. This 
again implies that as cotton area decreases, risk and income 
variability also decrease-. Between expected incomes of Ls. 768.000 
and Ls. 418.000 all crops, except groundnut, show steady reduction. 
Standard deviation and coefficient of variation also show a 
corresponding reduction. 
The set of efficient farm plans derived from Model 3 is traced 
a long the efficiency frontier in Figure 9. This frontier is slightly 
higher than the frontier derived for the basic model (Model 1). The 
trade-off between expected income as measured by the coefficient of 
variation is shown by the shape of the efficiency frontier. 
Effect of Increasing Both Hired Labor and 
Institutional Credit 
Resu 1 ts of a parallel increase in institutional credit and hired 
labor availability are shown in Table XIX. The maximum expected 
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SUMMARY SET OF EFFICIENT FARM PLANS ASSUMING A POTENTIAL INCREASE 
IN INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT - MODEL 3 
Plan la Plan 2 Plan 3 Plan 4 Plan 5 Plan 6 Plan 7 Plan 8 
868.444 818.000 768.000 718.000 668.000 568.000 518.000 468.000 
2928.882 2516.000 2290.000 2103.000 .1946.000 1946.000 1765.000 1486.000 
585. 765 513. 377 462.950 422 .184 377. 220 335.759 298. 286 258.140 
67.45 62. 76 60.28 58.80 56.47 54. 33 52.51 49.83 
,I 
13.8 12.2 11. 5 10.9 9.8 8.7 7.3 6.1 
5.3 4.8 4.4 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.6 2.2 
5.3 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.4 0.8 0.4 0.3 
3.2 3.2 3.4 3.5 4.0 4.2 3.9 3.3 
1. 5 1. 3 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.3 
1988.2 1854.4 1753.l 1685.5 1416.4 1351. 3 1193. 7 1006.6 
1650.0 1261.000 1155. 266 1084.920 880.010 698.958 562.481 474.164 
2029. 3 1575.3 1487.9 1429. 6 1258.l 1090. 3 932.9 786.4 
aThis Plan represents the linear programming profit maximization solution. 
Plan 9 Plan 10 
418.000 448.850 
1137 .000 926. 000 
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385.8 197.530 
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Hired Labor Use M.H. 
Institutional 
Credit Use Ls. 
Irrigation Water M3 
(Oct-Nov Peak 
only) 
aThis Plan represents 
TABLE XIX 
SUMMARY SET OF EFFICIENT FAIU1 PLANS ASSUMING A PARALLEL INCREASE IN 
BOTH INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT AND HIRED LABOR - MODEL 4 
Plan la Plan 2 Plan 3 Plan 4 Plan 5 Plan 6 Plan 7 Plan 8 Plan 9 
975.161 925.000 875.000 825.000 775. 000 725.000 675.000 625.000 575.000 
3428.000 2941.000 2681. 000 2500.000 2246.000 2061. 000 1785.000 1584.000 1505.000 
688. 104 618.270 557. 220 501. 765 450. 341 413. 706 358. 304 317.957 279.048 
70.56 66.84 63.68 60.82 58.17 57.06 53.08 50.87 48.53 
15.0 14. 7 14.0 13.4 12 .1 11.0 9.5 8.4 7.3 
6.6 5.7 5.3 5.1 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 
5.2 4.1 2.9 2.6 l.8 l.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 
3.2 3.2 4.4 4.5 4.9 5.2 5.1 4.6 4.0 
I. 7 l.4 I. 2 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 
2413. 9 2240. 7 2139.2 2070.8 1898.2 1727.6 1594.2 1406. 5 1218.9 
1650.000 1495 .457 1389 .937 1314. 742 1108. 691 925.287 750.980 662.663 574. 346 
2106.1 1902.5 1814.9 1752 .4 1579.8 1412.2 1245.4 1098.8 952.54 















income derived from this solution is Ls. 975.161 compared to Ls. 
848. 298 maximum expected income derived from the basic model (Model 
1). As expected, the increase in income is associated with more risk 
and more income variability. This is because the cropping pattern 
associated with maximum income devotes more area to cotton than any 
other crop. Consequently the resource use increases to its maximum 
level compared to all three previous models. 
The other efficient farm plans shown in Table XIX are traced out 
by parameterizing the expected income from Ls. 975.161 to Ls. 525.000 
in constant decrements of Ls. 50 each. Cotton and wheat area declines 
steadily as expected income decreases, while groundnut area shows a 
gradual increase from 3.2 feddans to 5.2 feddans in plan 6 and then 
decreases steadily. Sorghum comes into the solution in plan 2 at a 
level of 1.7 feddans, then declines steadily as income is 
parametrically reduced. Plans below expected income level of Ls. 
525. 000 are excluded from the analysis because the income variability 
as measured by the coefficient of variation begins to increase. This 
implies that decision makers have to. sacrifice a greater percentage of 
change in income for any given percentage reduction in risk as 
measured by the standard deviation. A rational producer is unlikely 
to choose plans with higher variability unless there are other 
exogenous reasons important to the producer but not represented in the 
model, such as a preference for off-farm work. As shown in Figure 10, 
the producer attains a higher risk efficiency frontier from Model 4 
than from Model 1. The reason is that an increase in both 
Expected 
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Figure 10. Risk-Efficiency Frontier for Model 1 and Model 4. 
Ls./U.T. 
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institutional credit and hired labor provides an opportunity for 
reorganization of the production pattern to attain less risk at any 
given level of income. 
To summarize the effect of an increse in resource base, the 
trade-off between any level of expected income and the corresponding 
risk levels is determined from the shape of the efficiency frontier. 
Each farm plan along the E-V frontier is an efficient plan in the 
sense that it specffies the minimum amount of risk associated with any 
given level of expected income. In considering alternative farm 
plans, the resource base is an itnportant economic criteria to be kep\: 
in sight. From the sensitivity results of hired labor and 
institutional credit it can be conctuded that the basic efficiency 
frontier (Mode 1 1) derived for the Gezira Scheme and the associated 
set of efficient farm plans are more sensitive to increases in hired 
labor than institutional credit given the underlying assumptions for 
the potential increase in both resources. By increasing both credit 
and hired labor availability, the Gezira tenant can attain a higher 
risk efficiency frontier. This implies that incres ing the tenant 
resource base of credit and hired labor is necessary to offset the 
risk associated with production organization and cropping pattern at 
the Farm and Scheme level. In all the models, .irrigation water is 
unlikely to be a limiting resource. However, timing and frequency of 
irrigation may be a problem to those tenants located a long distance 
from the dam or main canal. Lack of detailed data and information 
about the frequency and timing of irrigation water available at the 
field level limited a further investigation of this problem. 
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Effect of a Change in Producer Prices 
In this analysis the sensitivity of the optimum plan in the basic 
model (Model 1) is tested assuming that the producers are paid a price 
equivalent to the export parity price rather than the government 
market price. The concept of export parity price is introduced 
because the government market price is substantially lower than the 
corresponding world price. Disparities between export parity price 
and government market price may result in misallocation of resources 
caused by inefficiency in marketing channels and high export taxes and 
duties. For the purpose of economic analysis, export taxes and duties 
are considered as internal transfers from one sector of the economy to 
another and hence excluded from the analysis. The data for 
calculating export parity prices were obtained from different sources. 
The CIF prices for all commodities were obtained from FAQ Commodity 
Review Publications. Shipping, handling and transportation costs were 
based on estimations of the World Bank for 1979 expressed in 1982 
constant prices. The FOB price is converted to domestic currency 
(border prices) using the official exchange rate as the market 
equilibrium price. The calculation of gross margins using export 
parity price is presented in Appendix D. On the average, gross 
margins are 50 percent higher than the ones estimated using the 
government market prices. The summary set of efficient farm plans 
derived using export parity prices is presented in Table XX while the 
corresponding E-V frontier is traced in Figure 11. The resource base 
is kept at the same levels as in the basic model and only the gross 
margins and deviation matrix are changed. 
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SUMMARY SET OF EFFICIENT FARM PLANS DERIVED FROM THE GEZIRA BASIC MODEL 
USING EXPORT PARITY PRICES - MODEL 5 
Plan 13 Plan 2 Pla,i 3 Plan 4 Plan 5 Plan 6 Plan 7 Plan 8 Plan 9 
1420.915 1320 .ooo 1290.000 1270.000 1220.000 1170.000 1120.000 1070.000 1020.000 
2811,000 2297. 000 2062.000 1884.000 1707.000 1545.000 1354.000 1058.000 904.000 
564.056 460.917 413. 762 378.044 342.527 310.020 271. 694 212.298 181. 397 
39. 70 34.92 32.07 29. 77 28.07 26.49 24.26 19.84 17.78 
13.4 12.4 11. 5 11.2 9.8 8.7 7.4 6.8 6.1 
5.3 4.6 4.2 4.0 3.4 2.9 2.4 2.1 1.6 
4.2 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.2 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 
3.9 3.5 3.5 3.7 4.0 4.2 J.9 3.8 3.7 
1.8 1.6 1.5 1.2 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.1. 
1960.4 1795.5 1164. 5 1103.8 905.3 718.9 630.6 541.6 466.9 
1500.000 1280 .134 1162. 501 1105. 830 910. 311 780.900 640.698 584.631 482.905 
1848.7 1526.7 1480 ,5 1350 .1 1280.3 1059.6 982.5 . 850.9 660.7 
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Figure 11. Risk-Efficiency Frontier for Model 1 and Model 5. 
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As expected, the increase in crop gross margins have resulted in 
a higher expected income and less risk as compared to the basic model 
(Model 1). However, the cropping pattern and total area cultivated 
remains almost the same since the resource base of hired labor and 
institutional credit remained unchanged. 
Similar to the basic model, labor is in shortage during peak 
periods. The shadow wage rates during June, July and March are Ls. 
3. 765, Ls. 2.239 and Ls. 5.042, respectively. These values are higher 
than the corresponding shadow prices of the basic model depicted m 
table XV. It is clear that price policies have resulted in 
discrimination against agriculture through paying resources committed 
to agricultural production, especially labor and capital, lower 
returns. Indeed, labor wages in the Gezira Scheme are substantially 
lower than the comparative wage rates in other sectors such as 
industry and transportation sectors. The low returns to labor have 
resulted in rural-urban migration even among the family labor. The 
low returns to capital in agricultural investment in the Gezira Scheme 
may provide explanation why the private sectors' contribution to 
agricultural investment is minimal. The relatively stagnant 
performance of agriculture during the past decade is attributed in 
part to such price policy decisions. Based on this analysis, 
agricultural prices set at world levels and adjusted flexibly over 
time should increase returns to resources used 1.n agriculture 
substantially. Results of this border price policy further stabilizes 
domes tic prices with proportionally smaller variations. By permitting 
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the private sector to take on a greater role in performing 
agricultural marketing activities, the government may reduce 
distortions in domestic prices. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
Sunmary 
The primary objective of this study was to determine the optimum 
resource al location and enterprise combination taking into account the 
product price and yield variation on irrigated Gezira farms. This was 
accomplished using an LP-MOTAD model and data derived from sample 
information at the farm and Scheme level. A field survey of 50 Gezira 
tenants was conducted in January-February, 1984, to determine the 
socio-economic characteristics of the tenants and their resource base. 
Secondary data obtained from Gezira statistical records and research 
institutions were also utilized to determine the input-output 
coefficients of the basic model. 
Spec i fie objectives of the study included: (1) critical analysis 
of the past and present performance of the Gezira ~cheme taking into 
account economic, social and institutional constraints; (2) review of 
the theory of farm planning under risk; (3) estimation of the optimum 
farm resource and enterprise combinations assuming profit maximization 
and risk minimization decision criteria; and (4) evaluation of the 
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sensitivity of the different decision criteria to potential increases 
in hired labor, irrigation water,institutional credit and producer 
prices. 
• 
Performance of the Gezira Scheme 
The Gezira Scheme is unique in Africa and described to be one of 
the largest gravity irrigation areas in the world. It occupies more 
than half of the Sudan's irrigated land and provides direct employment 
for 96, 000 tenants and their families. The Scheme extends over the 
central clay l_ands of the Sudan covering an area of 2.2 million 
feddans ( 1 feddan = 1. 038 acres). The total area of the Scheme is 
divided into tenancies said to be homogenous and of an average size of 
15 feddans. The Gezira management sets forth rules and guidelines for 
the tenant that encompass all aspects of production and marketing, 
from seed variety selection to the market price of the produce. Under 
the existing cropping pattern, cotton and wheat occupy two thirds of 
the tenancy while the other third is devoted to groundnut,sorghum, and 
vegetable production. 
A review of the Gezira Scheme performance since the early 1970s 
to present reveals a declining trend in yields and net returns. 
Several economic, social, and institutional constraints contribute to 
the decreasing productivity trend. Government policy in the Gezira 
frequently ignores the tenants preference including attitudes towards 
risk. Historically, government interest has focused on cotton 
production which is the single cash crop accounting for about 50 
percent of Sudan's total exports. Cotton, however, is associated with 
llO 
high yield and price variability and thus contributes to income 
variability at the farm, scheme and country level. 
Despite low and fluctuating productivity of wheat, tenants are 
forced to devote one third of their area to wheat production. The 
cultivation of wheat in the Gezira Scheme is a direct consequence of 
government policy which is directed to the achievement of 
self-sufficiency in some basic food commodities. 
Theory of Enterprise Selection Under Risk 
The theoretical framework adopted in the analysis was the 
mean-variance efficiency criteria using Minimization of Total Absolute 
Deviation (MOTAD) approach. This approach usually assumes the 
decision maker maximizes expected utility. Thus his preference among 
alternative farm plans is expressed in terms of expected income and 
associated variance. Other assumptions are that the net returns or 
gross margins are considered to have a normal distribution, and the 
decision maker has a convex utility function which implies a risk 
aversion behavior. 
Historical time series data for yields, prices and cost of 
production provided the basis for calculating the net returns 
associated with each production activity. The time series data 
extends over the period 1971-83. Producers were assumed to base their 
plans on the long-term mean of net returns and that any deviation from 
the mean is a random event. The series of net returns was deflated 
using the GDP deflator to reflect 1982 constant prices. 
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Results of the Basic Model 
There are two steps in the computational procedure of the MOTAD 
model. First, a conventional linear programming maximization problem 
is formulated and solved to determine the maximum expected income or 
the highest attainable point on the risk efficiency frontier. Second, 
the elements of risk are introduced through minimization of total 
negative deviation represented by the objective function of the MOTAD 
model. Other points on the risk efficiency frontier are obtained by 
decreasing the maximum expected income parametrically in arbitrary 
decrements. Along the efficiency frontier, the MOTAD model minimizes 
total negative deviation (TND) for any given expected income. This 
TND va 1 ue is trans formed into an estimate of standard deviation by 
multiplication of a constant, K. This transformation allows the model 
to determine a set of efficient farm plans along an E-V efficiency 
frontier where E is the expected income and V is the variance of 
income. Depending on a farmer's attitude toward risk, he can select 
the farm plan that will maximize his utility. 
Fol lowing the above discussion, the results of the Gezira basic 
mode 1 have two components which are the profit maximization results 
derived from the linear programming model and the risk minimization 
resu 1 ts obtained after elements of risk are incorporated in the model. 
The profit maximization solution predicts that the cropping pattern 
should include 5. 3 feddans of cotton, 4.6 feddans of wheat and 3.5 
feddans of groundnut. The sorghum activity did not enter the profit 
maximization solution. The existing cropping pattern enforced by the 
management in the Gezira Scheme specifies five feddans of cotton, five 
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feddans of wheat, and five feddans to be shared between groundnut, 
sorghum and vegetables. The results of the profit maximization 
solution suggest that if risk is ignored, the existing cropping 
pattern which emphasizes cotton and wheat should be continued given 
the underlying assumptions concerning the resource base. 
On the resource side, the profit maximization plan is limited at 
the margin by institutional credit. Hired labor was found critical 
during peak planting, weeding and harvesting periods. Irrigation 
water was found. nonlimiting under the assumed supply conditions in the 
Gezira Scheme. The value of the objective function associated with 
the profit maximization plan was Ls. 848.298. 
The basic LP model is then extended to a MOTAD model by changing 
the objective function to minimization of total negative deviation and 
adding a deviation matrix. Ten different expected income levels were 
specified and for every income level a corresponding plan was derived 
and presented. Risk measurement statistics such as total negative 
deviation, standard deviation and coefficient of variation were used 
to describe the variability associated with each plan. 
When expected income was reduced from Ls. 848.298 to Ls. 798.298, 
cotton area reduced from 5.3 feddans to 4.6 feddans, wheat area 
reduced to 2. 5 feddans, while groundnut increased slightly to 3.6 
feddans. By reducing the area of cotton, the standard deviation and 
coefficient of variation were reduced by 12.46 and 4. 79 percent, 
respectively. This implies that high variability is associated with 
cotton and wheat production and as cotton and wheat becomes less 
important in the cropping pattern, risk in terms of variability is 
reduced. The subsequent farm plans associated with lower expected 
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incomes showed a steady decline in cropping area which is also 
associated with less resource use and less income variability. 
Sorghum production entered the solution in the second production 
plan. This implies that sorghum is associated with less risk but 
limited at the margin by the availability of labor during planting 
season. 
Results of the Sensitivity Analysis 
The set of efficient farm plans derived in the basic model show a 
relative reduction in risk, for any given level of expected income, 
associated with an increase in hired labor, institutional credit and 
producer prices. With increased hired labor, expected income of the 
profit maximization plan increased from Ls. 848.298 to Ls. 956.343. 
The area of cotton increased from 5.3 feddans to 6.5 feddans while 
wheat area reduced to 3.9 feddans. One possible explanation is that 
since cotton is more labor intensive than the other crops, by 
increasing the labor constraint more cotton area comes into production 
and consequently greater risk. On the resource side, hired labor 
increased by 22 percent implying that any attempt to increase cotton 
area on the representative farm should be associated with a 
corresponding increase in hired labor availability. The irrigation 
water consumption showed a relatively small increase of eight percent. 
As the expect.ed income was reduced parametrically from Ls. 
956.343 to Ls. 906.000, cotton and wheat area reduced while sorghum 
came into the solution at a level of 1.5 feddans. This change in 
cropping pattern was associated with a 16.67 percent and 4.32 percent 
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reduction in standard deviation and coefficient of variation, 
respectively. This implies that as cotton area is reduced, risk is 
also reduced. Between expected incomes of Ls. 906.000 and Ls. 506.000 
the standard deviation and coefficient of variation reduced steadily. 
When the institutional credit constraint was increased from Ls. 
1500 to Ls. 1650, the maximum expected income showed a corresponding 
increase from Ls. 848.298 to Ls. 868.444. Cotton area remained the 
same while wheat area increased from 4.6 feddans to 5.3 feddans. This 
may be explained by the fact that cotton is limited at the margin by 
labor constraint during March picking season as predicted earlier by 
the basic model. Wheat, on the other hand, was not limited in the 
basic model by hired labor but rather by institutional credit. 
Between expected incomes of Ls. 816.000 and Ls. 418.000 the 
cropping area showed a steady decline. The standard deviation and 
coefficient of variation also showed a reduction. Sorghum entered in 
the second plan at a level of 1. 5 feddans. Comparison of the 
efficiency frontier derived from Model 3 with the basic model revealed 
that at any given level of expected income Model 3 is associated with 
less risk. This implies that increasing institutional credit to the 
Gezira farmers reduces risk for any given level of expected income. 
As expected, results of a parallel increase in both institutional 
credit and hired labor availability showed an increase in both the 
maximum expected income and cropping area. The maximum expected 
income increased from Ls. 848.298 to Ls. 975.161. The cropping 
pattern associated with the maximum income devoted more area to cotton 
and consequently more risk. Resource use of institution~l credit and 
hired labor increased to the maximum level. This is because cotton is 
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a more labor and capital intensive crop compared to wheat and 
groundnut. As the expected income was parameterized from Ls. 975.161 
to Ls. 525.000 in constant decrements of Ls. 50, cotton and wheat area 
decreased steadily while groundnut showed a gradual increase up to 
plan 6 and then decreased steadily. Sorghum entered the solution in 
plan 2 at a level of 1.7 feddans. This implies that Gezira farmers 
tend to substitute sorghum for cotton as risk becomes important. 
The trade-off between any level of expected income and the 
corresponding risk level is determined from the shape of the 
efficiency frontier. Each farm plan along the E-V frontier is an 
efficient plan in the sense that it specifies the minimum amount of 
risk associated with any given level of income. In considering the 
alternative farm plans, credit seems to be the most important limiting 
factor fol lowed by availability of hired labor during peak periods. 
In all models, irrigation water was not a limiting resource. However, 
timing and frequency of irrigation may be a problem to those tenants 
located far from the dam or main canal. 
Finally, the sensitivity of the basic model to an increase in 
producer prices was tested assuming that the producers are paid a 
price equivalent to the export parity price rather than the government 
market price. The gross margins derived from export parity price are 
higher and less variable than those derived using the government 
market price. Consequently, the analysis resulted in higher expected 
incomes and less risk through all the efficient plans including the 
profit maximization plan. However, the cropping pattern and total 
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area cu 1 t iva ted remained almost the same as in the basic model since 
the resource base of hired labor and institutional credit remained 
unchanged. 
This analysis provides evidence that price policies in the Gezira 
Scheme have resulted in discrimination against agriculture through 
paying resources committed to agricultural production, especially 
labor and capital, lower returns. The low returns to labor have 
resulted in rural-urban migration and severe labor shortage problems 
in the Gezira Scheme. The low returns to capital provide an 
explanation of why the private sector, so far, is very reluctant to 
invest in agricultural production in the Gezira Scheme. 
Policy Implications 
As shown by the results of the MOTAD model, efficient resource 
allocation and enterprise combination in the Gezira risky environment 
requires making several adjustments to the existing agricultural 
production pattern. Such adjustments should include but not 
necessarily be limited to: ( 1) increasing groundnut and sorghum 
production; (2) reducing total area under cotton and wheat; (3) 
adjusting producers prices to world market level; and (4) improving 
efficiency in utilization of resources to raise tenant income and 
reduce risk. Since the tenants under the Gezira conditions cannot 
change the existing cropping pattern and pricing policy except with 
management participation and approval, government initiative is needed 
to bring about the more efficient resource use and stabilized income. 
Such initiative may be pursued along the following policy guidelines. 
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Increasing Groundnut Production 
Policies proposed for groundnut production are based on the 
Gezira's considerable potential for growing this crop at less risk and 
on the availability of profitable world markets. Under irrigated 
conditions the potential exists to increase yield and consequently 
make groundnut even more competitive with cotton. The realization of 
this potential is not in line with current government policy which 
aims at drastic reduction in groundnut production on irrigated 
schemes, primarily for the purpose of making room for expanded wheat 
production. For this reason, institutional credit has been shifted 
from groundnut to wheat production. 
Increasing groundnut production in the Gezira Scheme is a result 
of farmer' s risk attitude as shown by the MOTAD model. However, to 
achieve this target certain difficulties should be overcome. These 
relate to labor shortages for planting and harvesting operations, 
adequate research and extension to develop new high yielding 
varieties, increasing credit services, and more efficient marketing 
services and facilities. 
Increasing Sorghum Production 
Sorghum is the most important staple food crop in the Gezira 
area. Tenants were familiar with growing sorghum even before the 
establishment of the irrigation network. It is regarded as a risk 
management strategy against unforeseen future hazards since the major 
supply of sorghum in the Sudan is from the rainfed agricultural zones. 
However, the major bottlenecks for increasing sorghum production in 
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the Gezira Scheme is the scarcity of labor during planting season and 
low yields. Provision of labor-saving technologies, institutional 
credit services, marketing facilities and improved seeds is necessary 
to achieve higher productivity and incomes. 
Reducing Cotton Production 
Major constraints to further development of cotton production 
relate to high income variability and thus risk, labor shortages at 
the time of planting and picking, and institutional credit. Cotton is 
both a labor-intensive and a capital-intensive crop. It requires 
considerable production inputs such as fertilizers and insecticides 
which can be obtained only as imports and at considerable cost. At 
the same time research findings and experience indicate that cotton 
productivity is very sensitive to shortages in both inputs. Given the 
limited ability of the Sudan government to increase institutional 
credit, a reduction in cotton area would seem to be consistent with 
reducing risk associated with income variability. Other irrigated 
schemes surrounding the Gezira Scheme compete with Gezira for the same 
hired labor force. Mechanized harvesting would alleviate part of the 
problem. 
A detailed feasibility study for mechanical harvesting of cotton 
under the Gezira conditions is recommended if the existing efforts to 
increase cotton production is to be a risk-efficient alternative. 
Cotton mechanization would not displace labor in the aggregate but 
rather free labor to cu 1 t ivate other labor-intensive crops such as 
vegetables. 
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Reducing Wheat Cultivation 
A major constraint on limiting wheat production under Gezira 
conditions is the relatively low gross margins associated with low and 
fluctuating yields. The crop seems to be suffering from the shortness 
of the cool season and may need to be extended to new ecological 
zones, such as the northern part of the Sudan, where the relatively 
longer cold season is more favorable. 
The cultivation of wheat in the Gezira Scheme is a direct 
consequence of government policy which seeks self-sufficiency in some 
food commodities. However, choices among production possibilities 
should be based not only on political objectives but also on economic 
objectives and comparative advantage. It should be pointed out that 
attempts to increase wheat production in the Gezira Scheme at a lower 
risk must be associated with the development of new varieties suited 
to hot climates and relatively short growing periods. Wheat prices 
paid to Gezira tenants are relatively low in comparison with prices 
prevailing at the international level. Low government set prices 
reduces further the profitability of wheat cultivation. 
Adjusting Producer Prices to World Market Level 
By paying agricultural producers prices well below international 
levels, the government price policy in the Gezira Scheme discriminates 
against agriculture relative to enterprises in other sectors. Some of 
the implications of this discrimination is that both labor and capital 
are encouraged to move out of the agricultural sector. Both public 
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and private sector investments in agriculture are reduced relative to 
what would be without the discrimination. Furthermore, reduced 
investment in agriculture is likely to be associated with low growth 
and productivity of all agricultural resources and sectors linked to 
agriculture. 
To reduce the discriminatory effects of domestic agricultural 
price plicies, agricultural prices must be set at international levels 
and adjusted flexibly over time. By implementing a rational price 
policy, farmers will receive the right signal to mobilize resources in 
a manner compatible with the country's comparative advantage. 
Efficient Utilization of Resources 
Efficient utilization of resources and the improvement of 
agricultural services in the Gezira Scheme requires the development 
and adoption of suitable economic and institutional measures which may 
include: (1) efficient utilization of irrigation water; (2) improved 
credit services; (3) test of a suitable technology to alleviate the 
seasonal labor shortage problem; (4) a reconciliation of private and 
public efforts in the utilization of unused resources such as land and 
irrigation water; (5) development of crop marketing activities; (6) 
strengthening of the research and extension units; (7) effective 
price policy; (8) development of plant breeding and selection units; 
and ( 9) better weed control methods. These measures are discussed in 
more detail below. 
• 
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According to government sources 1.n the Sudan, irrigation costs 
absorb a large part of public sector investment. Frequently low water 
charges and inadequate taxes on agricultural incomes have made the 
burden on the government's budget heavier than it needs to be. To 
insure a reasonable return on irrigation investment in the Gezira 
Scheme, the system has to be carefully organized and fully utilized. 
Efficiency in water use is becoming increasingly critical, partly 
because of actual or threatened water shortages. More important, most 
of the high-yielding seeds require reliable supplies of water at 
specified times if they are to fulfill their promise. As indicated 1.n 
the study, at present no water quantity problem exists, however, the 
timing and frequency problems reported by the Gezira farmers should be 
emphasized and solved. Coordination between different ministries 
involved in supplying water to the Gezira Scheme, especially Ministry 
of Irrigation and Ministry of Agriculture, is crucial to improving 
water use efficiency. Furthermore, farmers themselves should share in 
the decision making process regarding the timing and frequency of 
waterings. 
As indicated in the study, institutional credit does offset the 
variability problem in farmer's expected incomes. Thus institutional 
credit should be further evaluated for expansion. The major 
limitation to such expansion relates to the lack of sufficient 
finances at the Scheme level. Loans granted by national credit 
institutions, such as the Agricultural Bank, are inaccessible to small 
farmers since they do not have the necessary collateral. Peasant 
tenants in the Gezira Scheme are forced to rely heavily on informal 
credit sources, and primarily the "shail" system under which they 
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receive advances in cash and kind from private merchants against 
promises to deliver crops after harvest, thus paying very high rates 
of interest. As most of the "shail" credit is usually not invested on 
the farm, it does not contribute to agricultural production and 1.n 
reality may impede it. To promote credit, both commercial and 
agricultural banks should extend their services to the villages and 
rural communities and should also develop closer links with 
cooperatives and collective farm organizations. Furthermore, if more 
farmers are to be served, interest rates and other charges should 
reflect the opportunity cost of lending and credit recovery. 
Given the seasonal labor shortage problem, research is needed 
to develop and test technologies most suited to Sudan's ecological, 
social and economical conditions. Mechanization has to play the 
crucial role in the effective utilization of the Gezira's scarce 
resource such as land and irrigation water and to alleviate the 
problems of seasonal labor shortages. 
Plans which leave land idle may be considered as basis for 
redistribution of land among landless residents in the Scheme area. 
Integration of livestock in the Gezira rotation may also provide an 
alternative for the utilization of unused or underutilized·land and .. 
water resources. It also provides scope for spreading the risk 
associated with raising only field crops. In this respect, the 
reconciliation of private and public efforts is recommended to 
establish specialized dairy and poultry production units to utilize 
unused resources and improve the diet of the Gezira farmers. 
Crop marketing activities are often the key to the development of 
subsistence agriculture. Marketing institutions are needed to 
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finance, sell, buy, transport, process and store products and to 
distribute inputs at the time and place needed. Once marketing 
channels are established, farmers are expected to respond eagerly to 
market opportunities. Gezira management can help in organizing the 
tenants into associations linked to a central distribution agency to 
build local storage facilities, to develop rural markets, and to 
conduct a consumer information program through the Scheme extension 
service. 
At present, fertilizer consumption in the Gezira Scheme is 
limited to only cotton and wheat. The development of research 
programs to determine the optimum fertilizer rates, optimum seeding 
rates, sowing dates and seed bed preparation is urgently required. 
The present crop protection services concentrate on cotton with 
relatively little attention given to other crops that suffer 
considerable losses. It is necessary, therefore, to provide crop 
protection measures if pests and diseases are to be removed as serious 
obstacles to further improvement in productivity. 
Producer prices in the Gezira Scheme are low and there is a lack 
of clear price policies to obtain development objectives of the Scheme 
and of the country. Higher producer prices combined with more 
rational taxation policies could provide effective stimulus for 
increased production and exports. Government fiscal policies which 
assign high priority to export taxes as major sources of revenues and 
consequently impose relatively high taxes on agricultural exports, 
should be reviewed with the purpose of making agriculture competitive 
on the world market. Import duties on agricultural inputs, especially 
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machinery, fertilizers and insecticides, should be evaluated relative 
to their impact on agricultural productivity. 
Exe ept for cot ton, 1 ittle has been done in the Gezira in plant 
breeding and selection. Future efforts should be oriented toward 
solution of the low resource productivity problem. Quality 
improvements in groundnut production is an important prerequisite for' 
successful competition in international markets. Again, except for 
cotton, no official seed organization exists in the country and the 
private seed agencies generally sell uncertified seed of low 
germination and with high percentage of foreign matter and weed seeds. 
Maj or emphasis needs to be placed on strengthening and expanding the 
capacity for seed propagation, seed importation and establishment of 
rural seed distribution companies. 
Weed infestation is frequently cited as the single major factor 
responsible for low and fluctuating yields in the Gezira Scheme. In 
view of labor shortages, better weed control can be obtained from 
better land preparation, mechanical cultivation and chemical weed 
control. In the short-run, Gezira farmers may have to continue to 
rely on the use of hand labor to the extent it is available. 
Meanwhile, government efforts are needed to develop new combinations 
of mechanical and hand labor systems for improving cultivation and 
weed control methods. 
Fina 11 y, current foreign aid policy in the Sudan depends heavily 
on multilateral agencies, especially the World Bank and its affiliates 
such as the International Development Association and the 
International Monetary Fund. So far, the largest share of 
international loans has been devoted to establishing new irrigation 
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projects with the main objective of producing cotton as the principal 
cash crop. Little or no attention has been given to improving the 
technical and institutional framework of ex:isting agricultural 
projects such as the Gezira Scheme. However, the development of 
transportation, mechanization, storage, improved irrigation 
facilities, credit institutions and agricultural processing facilities 
need to be further emphasized and call for more bilateral assistance. 
Limitations and Need for Further Research 
A number of important limitations of this analysis deserve 
mentioning. Primary among these is the scarcity of detailed and 
reliable information at the farm and Scheme level. Data about 
vegetables which provide scope for diversification and further 
reduction in risk are not available. This limitation has restricted 
the analysis to the main crops under the existing rotation which are 
cot ton, wheat, groundnut and sorghum. Data have also limited the 
analysis of mechanization effects to alleviate labor shortage 
problems. This is because mechanization in the Gezira Scheme is very 
1 imi t ed and data ab out input-output coefficients are not available. 
Further research is needed to incorporate the effects of mechanization 
in the analysis once detailed and reliable information is obtained. 
A second limitation relates to whether an expectation model which 
measures risk as the deviation from the mean of net returns for a 
series of years is a reliable measure. Weighted moving average models 
may be theoretically better for evaluating risk based on a long series 
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of historical data. However, the choice of appropriate weights for 
computing moving average is still an empirical limitation. More 
research is needed to resolve the questions of how farmers perceive 
risk and what measure of risk is appropriate in farm planning models. 
Another limitation relates to the use of aggregate data at the 
Scheme level on yields, prices and costs in deriving net returns. 
This aggregation may have a downward bias on the estimated standard 
deviation since aggregation itself averages out part of the 
variability. Therefore, efforts should be made to collect and record 
farm-level time series data for future use in risk analysis. 
The use of official exchange rates to convert FOB prices to 
domestic border prices may over- or under-value the returns to some 
resources and production activities. That is because in countries 
1 ike Sudan, the official exchange rate frequently overvalues the real 
exchange rate of the Sudanese pound. Research is needed to estimate 
the real exchange rate of the Sudanese currency taking into account 
market distortions and the scarcity of foreign currency in the Sudan. 
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DETAILED ENTERPRISE BUDGETS EXPRESSED 
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TABLE XXI 
DETAILED COST OF PRODUCTION BUDGET 
FOR COTTON, SEASON 1982-83 
------Ls./Fed.------
I. Land Preparation Operations: 
Deep· plowing 
Ridging 
Opening irrigation canals 
Raising of field channels 
Irrigation labor 
Mixing and spraying of fertilizer 
Subtotal 







Cleaning field canals 
Subtotal 
III. Harvest Operations: 
Transport of picking labor 
Picking labor 
Sacking 








Transport of materials 
Subtotal 
V. Interest on operating capital 


































DETAILED COST OF PRODUCTION BUDGET 
FOR WHEAT, SEASON 1982-83 
------Ls./Fed.------
I. Land Preparation Operations: 
Plowing 
Opening field channels 
Irrigation labor 
Cleaning irrigation canals 
Subtotal 






III. Harvest Operations: 







































DETAILED COST OF PRODUCTION BUDGET 
FOR GROUNDNUT, SEASON 1982-83 
------Ls./Fed.------
I. Land Preparation Operations: 
Plowing 
Opening of field channels 
Irrigation labor 
Cleaning irrigation canals 
Subtotal 






III. Harvest Operations: 
Pulling and collection 
Threshing and packing 



































DETAILED COST OF PRODUCTION BUDGET 
FOR SORGHUM, SEASON 1982-83 
------Ls./Fed.------
Land Preparation Ope~ations: 
Plowing 3.813 
Cleaning field channels 1.568 
Irrigation labor 0.129 







Irrigation labor 2.050 






Land and water rates 7.000 




MEAN WATER REQUIREMENTS FOR CROPS IN THE GEZIRA 























MEAN WATER REQUIREMENTS FOR CROPS IN THE 
GEZIRA SCHEME IN CUBIC METERS PER 
FEDDAN PER DAY 
Ground-








60.00 19 .oo 481.95 
18. 20 19. 50 481.95 
20.00 21. 50 21.00 481.95 
27.00 22 .50 481.95 
13.80 30.30 25.00 481.95 
15.00 31.50 28.50 481.95 
16.80 32.00 31.50 481.95 
18.90 32.00 32.00 481.95 
23.50 30.00 31.00 10.00 10.00 481.95 
28.50 25.00 29 .oo 15.00 15.00 605.09 
30.30 17. 80 24. 50 25.00 15.00 15.00 605 .09 
30. 30 21. 50 25.00 15.00 15.00 605.09 
30.30 18.00 16.90 481.95 
30.00 15.00 21.80 481.95 















TABLE XXV (continued) 
Ground-






27.00 28.80 481.95 
26.00 29 .20 481.95 
24. 50 28.60 481.95 
22. 30 24. 70 494. 69 
22. 30 24. 70 494. 69 
21. 50 21. 30 494.69 
20.50 16.20 494. 69 





Source: H.G. Farbrother; water requirements of crops in the Gezira, in cotton 
research reports, Republic of the Sudan 1972/73. 
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TABLE XXVI 
THE INITIAL TABLEAU OF THE MOTAD MODEL 
Row 
Re.sources Type R.H.S. xl x2 x3 x dl d2 d3 rl m t 
Minimize: 
. Objective (TND) . 1 1 1 1 
Resource 1 L or G Bl all al2 al3 aln 
Resource 2 L or G B2 a21 a22 a23 a2n 




Resource m II B aml am2 am3 a m mn 
Year 1 G 0 Dll 012 013 Dln 1 
Year 2 G 0 021 022 023 D2n 1 
• 
Year 3 G 0 0 31 0 32 033 D3n 1 
II II " 
II II II 
" II " 
Year t G () Dtl Dt2 Dt3 D 1 tn 
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IW4 l B B B c 
IW5 l B B B c 
IW6 l B B c 
SC N I I 
SSC N I 
YR83 G -C C-8-B 
YRB2 G C-C-B-8 
YRBI G -C-C BB 
YRBO G -c·-c-A A 
YR79 G C-C-B-B 
YR78 G CC B-8 
YR71 G C C-B-A 
VR76 G -C C-B-A 
YR75 G -c-c cc 
YR74 G c c c c 
YR73 G C C C B 
YR72 G C C-B-C 
YR71 G c-c-c-c 
AVGM E C B C c -T-T-T-T-T-T-T-T-T-T-T-T-U-T-T C-B 
TABLE XXVII (Continued) 
MPSX/370 Rl.6 PTF9 GEZIRA PAGE 9 84/199 
co Wit GN so 6FLB 7FLB 8FLB 9FlB t. ... t 
ACTIVITY ACTIVITY 
LANO 1.00000 t.00000 1.00000 1.00000 LANO 
6FL .67000 6.42000 3.54000 1 .00000- 6FL 
7FL .52000 4 .92000 6.51000 1.00000- 7Fl 
8FL 5.82000 5.87000 1.00000- 8FL 
9FL 9.90000 2.46000 3.50000 1 .00000- 9FL 
tOFL 11.52000 .48000 .30000 .30000 IOFL 
IIFL 5.46000 7 .54000 .20000 15.43000 ltfl 
12FL 2.94000 7 .50000 4. 18000 5.61000 12FL 
IFL 8.35000 .48000 2. 12000 .80000 IFL 
2FL 15.28000 1.92000 2FL 
3FL 22. 17000 1.88000 3FL 
4FL 6.69000 4FL 
5FL . 12000 5FL 
6HL 33. 51000 4. 71000 6Hl 
7HL 1.01000 32.10000 21.65000 711l 
8Hl 13.21000 13. 14000 17 .42000 BIR 
9HL 16 .32000 6.90000 1 .38000 9Hl 
tC*IL 18. 42000 .44000 1.08000 .68000 tOIIL 
ltHL 1.53000 2.13000 10. 12000 22.05000 1 llll 
t2Hl 1.15000 2 .93000 36. 58000 40.96000 12Hl 
IHL 11.95000 11.95000 2.28000 2.00000 IHL 
2HL 75.10000 I. 76000 2Hl 
3HL 79.46000 .68000 31tl 
4HL 30. 13000 1.94000 4Hl 
OCCOWH 330.26100 140.59000 OCCOWH 
OCGNSO 107.00000 87. 71600 OCGNSO 
!CTR 197 .40400- 116.02900- !CTR 
IW1 28.50000 29.00000 25.00000 !Wt 
IW2 30.30000 25.00000 24. 50000 17 .80000 IW2 
IW3 30.30000 25.00000 21. 50000 IW3 
IW4 30.30000 16. 90000 18.00000 IW4 
IW5 30.30000 21.80000 15.00000 IW5 
IW6 28.50000 26.90000 IW6 
SSC t.00000 SSC 
YR83 126. 98400- 127 .87300 37 .48600- 2 I .95000- YR83 
YR82 112 .62500 100.04100- 60. 16300- 35.45500- YR82 
VR81 184 .95600- :30.24400- 21.03300 32 .011500 VR81 
VR80 128. !52800- 114. 54300- 9.82800- I. 83800 YR80 
YR79 110.58000 128. 44800- 39.31400- 39.39500- YR79 
YR78 184.96600 116.52300 41.31700 23.44400- YR78 
VR77 119. 45000 114. 19800 19.88100- 4 .93000- VR77 
YR76 167 .37000- 100.89000 17 .30900- I. 28800- VR76 
YR75 114 .94800- 113. 31300- 116.08200 316.62400 YR75 
VR74 148.09200 100.61200 101.45800 117. 44700 YR74 
YR73 160.33900 115.69300 108.50200 35.25500 YR73 
YR72 124. 72700 115.29900 95.03900- 112 .60200- YR72 
VR71 177.51600 114. 50300- 109. 37400- 100.17800- YR71 
AVGM 342.70000 52.72800 196.60500 135. 79100 AVGM 
TABLE XXVII (Continued) 
MPSX/370 Rl.6 PTF9 GEZIRA PAGE 10 84/199 
IOFLB 11FLB 12FLB 1FLB 2FLB 3FLB 4FLB 5FLB 2 .... 1 
ACTIVITY ACTIVIIY 
IOFL 1.00000- 10FL 
IIFL 1.00000- IIFL 
12FL 1.00000- 12FL 
IFL 1.00000- 1FL 
2FL 1.00000- 2FL 
3FL 1.00000- 3FL 
4FL 1.00000- 4FL 
5H 1·.00000- 5Fl 
MPSX/370 Rl.6 PTF9 GEZIRA PAGE 11 84/199 
FACAPTRI FACAPTR2 GllLB 7HLB 8HtB 9!-ILB 10HLB 1 IIILB 3. ... 1 ACTIVITY 
ACTIVITY 
GHL 1.00000- 6Hl 7HL 1.00000- 71ll Bill 1.00000- OHL 911l 1.00000- 91-IL IOHL 1.00000- IOlll 11Hl 1.00000- 1 lfll OCCOWH 1.00000- .50000 .45800 .41700 .37500 .33300 .29200 OCCOWH OCGNSO 1.00000- .50000 .451100 .41700 .37500 .33300 .29200 OCGNSO FLOCTR 1.00000 1.00000 FLOCTR 6Hl14AX 1.00000 6HLMAX 711Ll4AX 1.00000 7HLMAX BHLNAX 1.00000 BHLMAX 9Hl14AX 1.00000 911ll4AX 10Hl14AX 1.00000 IOlllMAX 11HLMAX 
1.00000 11HLMAX AVGl4 .50000- .50000- .50000- .50000- .50000- .50000- AVGM 
TABLE XXVII (Continued) 
MPSX/370 RI .6 PTF9 GEZIRA PAGE 12 84/199 
121·1LB lllLB 2HLB 3HLB 4HLB 5HLB ICB SCBI 4 . . . I ACTIVITY ACT I VJTV 
12HL 1.00000- 12HL llll 1.00000- IHL 2Hl 1.00000- 2HI. 3Hl 1.00000- 311l 4HL 1.00000- 4fll 5HL 1.00000- 5Hl DCCOWH .25200 .20800 . 16600 .12500 .08300 .04200 I .00000- 1.00000- OCCDWH DCGNSD .25200 .20800 . 16600 .12500 .08300 .04200 OCGNSO ICTR 1.00000 ICTR ICMAX 1.00000 ICMAX 12HLMAX 1.00000 12HLMAX IHLMAX I .00000 IHLMAX 2HLMAX 1.00000 2HLMAX 3HL14AX 1.00000 3flLMAX 4HLMAX 1.00000 411LMAX 5HLMAX 1.00000 51llMAX SC 1.00000 SC AVGM .50000- .50000- .50000- .50000- .50000- .50000- .10000- .50000- AVGM 
MPSX/370 RI.& PTF9 GEZJRA PAGE 13 84/199 
SC82 DVR83 DVR82 DVRIII DVR80 DVR79 DVR78 DVR77 5 .... I ACTIVITY 
ACTIVITt 
c 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 I .00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 c DCGNSO I .00000-
SC 1.00000 OCGNSO 
SC VR83 1.00000 VRB3 VR82 1.00000 VR82 VRBI 1.00000 VRBI VR80 1.00000 VR80 VR 019 1.00000 VR79 VR78 
1.00000 VR78 VR77 
1.00000 VR77 AVGM .50000-
AVGM 
TABLE XXVII (Continued) 
MPSX/370 Rl.6 PTF9 GEZIRA PAGE 14 84/199 
DVR76 DVR75 DYR74 DYR73 DYR72 DYR71 B CIICDL 6 .... I 
ACTIVITY ACTIVITY 
c 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 c 
LAND 15.00000 LAND 
GFL 250.00000 &FL 
7fL 250.00000 7FL 
BFL 250.00000 8Fl 
9FL 250.00000 9FL 
IOFL 250.00000 IOFL 
IIFL 250.00000 llfl 
12Fl 250.00000 12fl 
IFL 250.00000 IFL 
2FL 250.00000 2FL 
3FL 250.00000 3FL 
4FL 250.00000 4FL 
5FL 250.00000 5Fl 
FLDCTR 500.00000 FLDCTR 
ICMAX 1500.0000 ICMAX 
GHLMAX 140.00000 GHLMAX 
7HLMAX 140.00000 711LMAX 
8HLMAX )40.00000 8HLMAX 
9HLMAX 140.00000 9HLMAX 
I OHL MAX 210.00000 IOHLMAX 
I IHLMAX 210.00000 I lftLMAX 
1211LMAX 210.00000 12HLMAX 
IIILMAX 420.00000 IHLMAX 
2HLMAX 420.00000 2HLMAX 
3HLMAX 420.00000 3HLMAX 
4HLMAX 420.00000 41lLMAX 
5HLMAX 140.00000 5HLMAX 
IWI 605.09000 IWI 
IW2 605.09000 IW2 
IWJ 605.09000 IW3 
IW4 481 .95000 IW4 
IW5 481.95000 IW5 
IWG 481.85000 IWG 
YR76 1.00000 YR76 
YR75 1.00000 YR75 
YR74 1.00000 YR74 
YR73 1.00000 YR73 
YR72 1.00000 YR72 
YR71 1.00000 YR71 
AVGM 848.29800 50.00000- AVGM 
• 
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TABLE XXVIII 
ESTIMATION OF EXPORT PARITY PRICE PER TON OF COTTON EXPRESSED IN 
1982 CONSTANT PRICES, 1971-83 
Particulars 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
CIF price 
a 
(European Ports) ($) 860.00 786.69 1068. 7J 988. ll 965.51 998. 72 813.94 962. 34 727 .19 719 .89 434.97 
Shipping cost 
b ($) 38.42 38 .t,2 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 
FOB price 
(Port Sudan) ($) 821. 58 748. 27 1030. 31 949.69 927.09 960.09 775. 52 923.92 688. 77 681.47 396.55 
FOB price in c 
domestic currency (La.) 410. 790 374 .135 515.155 474.845 463.545 640.060 517.0ll 615.947 688. 770 681.470 708.125 
Port hand ling cost 
b 
(Ls.) 3.430 3.430 3.430 3.430 3.430 3.430 3.430 3.430 3.430 3.430 3.430 
Tra~sportationbfrom 
Scheme to Port (Le.) ll.220 ll.220 ll.220 ll. 220 ll.220 13. 220 13.220 13. 220 13.220 13. 220 13.220 
Export parity price 
per ton (Le.) 394.14 357.485 498.505 458.195 446.895 623.410 500. 363 599.297 672.12 664.820 691.475 
aSource: FAD Commodity Review. • 
bShipping, handling and transportation costs are based on World Bank (1979) estimations. 





424.45 359. 53 
757.946 642. 018 
3.430 3.430 
13.220 LJ. 220 
741. 296 625.368 
TABLE XXIX 
ESTIMATION OF EXPORT PARITY PRICE PER TON OF WHEAT EXPRESSED IN 
1982 CONSTANT PRICES, 1971-83 
Particulars 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 r~8o 
CIF price 
a 
(European Ports) ($) 420. 24 363. 78 317.61 493.68 675.43 481. 03 305. 63 359.40 419.85 339 .11 
Shipping cost 
b ($) 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 
FOB price 
(Port Sudan) ($) 381.82 325.36 279.19 455. 26 637 .01 442.61 267.21 320.98 381.43 300.68 
FOB price in 
c domestic currency (Ls.) 190.910 162.680 139. 595 227.630 318.505 295.073 178.140 213.987 381.430 300.680 
Port handling costb (Le.) 3.420 3.420 3.420 3.420 3.420 3.420 3.420 3.420 3.420 3.420 
Transportationbfrom 
Scheme to Port (Le.) 13. 220 13. 220 13. 220 ll.220 13.220 13. 220 13.220 13.220 13.220 13.220 
Export parity price 
per ton (Le.) 174. 260 146. 030 122.945 210.980 301. 855 278.423 161.490 197.337 364. 780 284. 030 
8 Source: FAO C0111111odity Review. 






























ESTIMATION OF EXPORT PARITY PRICE PER TON OF GROUNDNUT EXPRESSED IN 
1982 CONSTANT PRICES, 1971-83 
Particulars 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
CIF price 
a 
(European Ports) ($) 534. 77 412.43 484.07 550.89 399. 34 342.44 344 .12 318. 74 265.20 177.10 178.52 
Shipping cost 
b ($) 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 
FOB price 
(Port Sudan) ($) 496.35 374. 01 445.659 512.47 360.92 304.02 305. 75 310. 32 226. 78 138.68 140.10 
FOB price in 
c domestic currency (Ls.) 248.175 187.005 222 .825 256.235 180.460 202.680 203. 333 206.880 226. 780 138.680 250.179 
Port handling costb (Ls.) 3.430 3.430 3.430 3.430 3.430 3.430 3.430 3.430 3.430 3.430 3.430 
Transportationbfrom 
Scheme to Port (Ls.) 13. 220 13. 220 13.220 13. 220 13. 220 13. 220 l3. 220 13.220 13.220 13.220 13. 220 
Export parity price 
per ton (Ls.) 231. 525 170. 355 206 .175 239.585 163.810 186.030 187. 333 190.230 210.130 122.030 233.529 
aSource: FAO Commodity Review. 
b . . 





105 .84 149.49 
189.000 266.946 
3.430 3.430 
13.220 13. 220 
172. 350 250. 296 
cFOB price is converted to domestic currency using official exchange rate for foreign currency as the market equilibrium rate. 
TABLE XXXI 
ESTIMATION OF EXPORT PARITY PRICE PER TON OF SORGHUM EXPRESSED IN 
1982 CONSTANT PRICES, 1971-83 
Particulars 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
CIF price 
a 
(European Ports) ($) 369. 33 440. 54 258.48 451. 37 739.59 249. 27 511. 24 336.36 224.88 609.09 209. 73 
Shipping cost b ($) 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 38.42 
FOB price 
(Port Sudan) ($) 330.91 402 .12 . 220 .06 412.95 701.17 210.85 472.82 297.94 186.46 570.67 171.31 
FOB price in c domestic currency (Le.) 165.455 201.060 110.030 206.475 350.585 140.567 315.213 198.627 186.460 570.670 305. 911 
Port handling cost b (Le.) 3.430 3.430 3.430 3.430 3.430 3.430 3.430 3.430 3.430 3.430 3.430 
Transportation from 
Scheme to Portb (Le.) 13. 220 13. 220 13. 220 13. 220 13.220 13.220 13.220 13.220 13. 220 13.220 13. 220 
Export parity price 
per ton (Le.) 148.805 184.410 93.380 189. 825 333.935 123.917 298. 563 181.977 169.810 551 •• 020 289. 201 
aSource: FAO Commodity Review. 
bShipping, hand ling and transportation costs are based on World Bank (1979) estimations. 




































ESTIMATION OF GROSS MARGINS PER FEDDAN OF COTTON USING 
EXPORT PARITY PRICES EXPRESSED IN 1982 
CONSTRANT PRICES, 1971-83 
Export 
Parity Gross Cost of Gross 
Price Yield Returns Production Margins 
153 
(Ls./ton) (Tons I fed. ) (Ls. /fed.) (Ls./fed.) (Ls./fed.) 
394.140 o. 782 308.217 117. 535 190.683 
357.485 o. 713 254. 887 119. 235 135.651 
498. 505 0.583 290. 628 120.508 170.120 
458.195 o. 723 331. 275 171.078 160.179 
446.895 0.657 293. 610 151. 682 141.928 
623.410 0.388 241.883 184.977 56.906 
500.363 0.523 261.690 154.335 107. 355 
599.297 0.613 367.369 171.383 195.986 
672.120 0.467 313.880 184 .106 129. 774 
664. 820 0.380 252.632 171. 923 80. 707 
691.475 0.329 227 .495 158.302 69 .193 
741. 296 o. 555 411.419 222.665 188.754 

















TABLE XXXI I I 
ESTIMATION OF GROSS MARGINS PER FEDDAN OF WHEAT USING 
EXPORT PARITY PRICES EXPRESSED IN 1982 
CONSTRANT PRICES, 1971-83 
• 
Export 
Parity Gross Cost of 




(Ls./ton) (Tons I fed.) (Ls. /fed.) (Ls. /fed.) (Ls. /fed.) 
174.260 0.367 63.953 40.300 23.653 
146.030 0.512 74. 76 7 50. 564 24. 203 
122.945 0.66-8 82 .127 53.485 28. 642 
210.980 0.800 168.784 64. 421 104.363 
301. 855 0.386 116.516 54. 365 62 .151 
278.423 0.388 108. 028 45.385 62.643 
161.490 0.580 93. 664 64. 000 29. 664 
197.337 0.471 92.946 61.190 31.756 
364. 780 o. 251 91. 560 86. 346 5.214 
284.030 0.476 135. 198 78.477 56. 721 
544. 046 0.500 272.023 120.840 151.ldJ 
495.993 0.400 198. 397 112.665 85.732 


















ESTIMATION OF GROSS MARGINS PER FEDDAN OF GROUNDNUT USING 
EXPORT PARITY PRICES EXPRESSED IN 1982 
CONSTRANT P&ICES, 1971-33 
Export 
Parity Gross Cost of Gross 
Price Yield Returns Production Margins 
155 
(Ls./ton) (Tons/fed.) (Ls./fed.) (Ls./fed.) (Ls./fed.) 
231. 525 0.413 95.620 61.869 33. 751 
170.355 0.501 85.348 60.884 24 .469 
206.175 1.250 257.719 51. 333 206.386 
239.585 1.250 299.481 49.000 250.481 
163.810 1.500 245. 715 53.944 191. 771 
186.030 0.767 142.685 52. 66 7 90.018 
187.333 1. 200 224.800 52.816 171.984 
190. 230 1.070 203.546 so. 671 152.875 
210.130 0.872 183.233 50.000 133.233 
122.030 1. 200 146.436 59 .135 87. 301 
233.529 0.605 141. 285 56.516 84. 769 
172.350 1. 200 206.820 49.486 157.334 




ESTIMATION OF GROSS MARGINS PER FEDDAN OF SORGHUYM USING 
EXPORT PARITY PRICES EXPRESSED IN 1982 
CONSTRANT PRICES, 1971-83 
.. 
Export 
Parity Gross Cost of Gross 
Year Price Yield Returns Production Margins 
(Ls./ton) (Tons/fed.) (Ls. /fed.) (Ls. /fed.) (Ls./fed.) 
1971 148.805 0.507 75 .444 57. 743 17.701 
1972 184.410 0.436 80. 403 50. 240 30. 163 
1973 93. 380 1.000 93.380 39. 072 54. 308 
1974 189. 825 o. 750 142. 369 32.483 109.885 
1975 333.935 0.623 208. 042 39 .474 168.568 
1976 123.917 0.655 81.166 31. 338 49. 827 
1977 298.563 o. 354 105. 691 28.909 76.782 
1978 181.977 0.427 77. 704 28. 771 48.933 
1979 169. 810 0.500 84.905 29. 307 55.598 
1980 554.020 0.250 138.505 30.463 108.042 
1981 289. 201 0.400 115 .680 29. 397 86.283 
1982 414.814 0.500 207 .407 41.480 165.927 
1983 485.082 o. 523 253.698 46.596 207.102 
Mean 90. 717 
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